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rights violators. This Article first examines the A TT and observes that
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then provides case studies of the current supply of arms to the
dictatorship in Zimbabwe and to the warlords in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Article argues that the ATT would do
nothing to remediate the conditions that have allowed so many arms to
be acquired by human rights violators. The ATT would have no more
effective force than the embargoes that are already imposed by the U.N.
Security Council; therefore U.N. member states, including China, which
violate current Security Council embargoes, could just as well violate
ATT embargoes. Accordingly, the ATT is a distraction, and human
rights activists should instead examine alternative methods of addressing
the problem of arms in the hands of human rights violators.
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CONCLUSION

In this Article, we examine whether the proposed Arms Trade
Treaty (ATT), currently being drafted at the United Nations, can be
expected to achieve the stated goal of its proponents: to control the flow
of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and thereby to prevent
humanitarian and human rights abuses.
The Article begins by surveying the record of previous failed
international arms embargoes and by describing several daunting
challenges to an effective ATT: the large number of unstable nations
that produce arms; the current international system of state sovereignty;
the well-established practice of dictatorial governments ratifying but then
ignoring human rights treaties; and the nature of the black market.
Part II of the Article details the current, unsuccessful efforts to
restrict the flow of arms to the dictatorship in Zimbabwe. Part II also
considers whether an ATT would improve the possibility for an effective
embargo against the Mugabe regime.
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Part III conducts a similar case study of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC), which the U.N. Security Council put under an arms
embargo in 2003, with an expanded embargo imposed in 2005. Part III
also examines the role of the U.N. itself in illegal arms smuggling into
the DRC.
Given the dim prospects that an ATT will make for more effective
embargoes against human rights violators, Part IV offers some
alternative approaches for reducing arms flows to rights violators and for
providing protection to victims.
I.

THE FAILURES OF ARMS EMBARGOES

The leading international gun prohibition lobby is Control Arms,' a
subsidiary of Oxfam, Amnesty International, and IANSA (the
International Action Network on Small Arms).
Control Arms
forthrightly acknowledges that "every one of the 13 United Nations arms
embargoes imposed in the last decade has been systematically
violated....
Accordingly, Control Arms recommends the establishment of "a
more effective framework of controls based on a common set of criteria
for international arms transfers fully consistent with international law:
an international Arms Trade Treaty." However, Control Arms does not
1. See Control Arms Campaign, http://www.controlarms.org/en (last visited Oct. 6,
2009).
2. See CONTROL ARMS, UN ARMS EMBARGOES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAST TEN
YEARS
1
(Mar.
16,
2006),
available
at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-wedo/issues/conflictdisasters/downloads/bn-armsemb
argoes.pdf [hereinafter "UN ARMS EMBARGOES: AN OVERVIEW"] ("[Elvery one of the 13
United Nations arms embargoes imposed in the last decade has been systematically
violated.. . ."); see also SARAH PARKER, U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH,
IMPLICATIONS OF STATES' VIEWS ON AN ARMS TRADE TREATY 49, Box 8 (Jan. 2008),
available at http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-008-B-en.pdf ("Evidence
suggests that UN arms embargoes have done little to stem the flow of weapons to target
countries and that violations have consistently occurred."); PAUL CORNISH, CHATHAM
HOUSE, AN INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE TREATY: BUILDING CONSENSUS AND MAKING IT
WORK
24
(June
28,
2007),
available
at
http://www.chathamhouse.org.udfiles/9387-050607armstrade.pdf.
("It is widely perceived that regional and international efforts at conventional arms trade
regulation have not worked."); TOWARDS AN ARMS TRADE TREATY: NEXT STEPS FOR THE
UN
PROGRAMME
OF
ACTION
8
(June
2005),
available
at
http://www.iansa.org/control-arms/documents/att-bms-en.pdf [hereinafter "TOWARDS AN
ATT"] ("Current controls do not work."); see also DAMIEN FRUCHART, ET AL., UNITED
NATIONS ARMS EMBARGOES: THEIR IMPACT ON ARMS FLOWS AND TARGET BEHAVIOUR,V
(2007), available at http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/UNAE/SIPRIO7UNAE.pdf (The
U.N. "embargoes that have been introduced since 1990 have been assessed as having a
limited impact on both arms flows to and the behaviour of embargoed targets.").
3. See UN ARMS EMBARGOES: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 2, at 5; see also Kim
Sengupta, Embargoes on global arms trade have been total failure, says UN, THE
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explain how an ATT embargo could be more effectively enforced than a
U.N. Security Council embargo.
At the direction of the United Nations General Assembly, an Arms
Trade Treaty is currently being drafted. The second drafting meeting
took place July 13-17, 2009, in New York City.4 Further meetings are
planned through 2011.5
Under current international law, the United Nations Security
Council can impose a mandatory arms embargo when acting under its
powers granted by Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which authorizes the
Security Council to act against threats to international peace.6 As with
any proposed Security Council action, each of the five permanent
members of the Security Council (the United States, United Kingdom,
France, Russia, and China) holds veto power.
Although a final version of the ATT is being negotiated, proponents
hope that the ATT will allow for the imposition of mandatory embargoes
without the consent of the Security Council. Because of the veto power
of China and Russia, the Security Council has not been able to impose an
arms embargo on Zimbabwe, but an outside mechanism, under the
auspices of an ATT, might be able to do so.
At the current stage in negotiations, it is not clear that the advocates
of embargoes without Security Council approval will get their wish.
Like most other modern global treaties, the ATT would be administered

INDEPENDENT (UK), Mar. 16, 2006; Abid Aslam, Watchdogs Target Small Arms, Saying
Dealers 'Defy UN Embargoes,' ONEWORLD.NET, Mar. 17, 2006, available at
http://us.oneworld.net/node/129385 (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
For an excellent discussion of incorporation of international humanitarian norms
into an ATT, see INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS: APPLYING
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW CRITERIA, PRACTICAL GUIDE § 3.1 (2007), available
at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/PANA7DQHUZ/$file/icrc mav2007.
pdflopenelement.
4. UK Arms Control & Disarmament, Towards an International Arms Trade
Treaty, Second Meeting of the Open Ended Working Group (13-17 July 2009), available
at
http://ukunarmscontrol.fco.gov.uk/en/the-uk-disarmament/armstradetreaty#
(last
visited Oct. 5, 2009).
5. U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs, Towards an Arms Trade Treaty, available
at http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ArmsTradeTreaty/html/ATT.shtml
(last
visited Oct. 5, 2009).
6. The Security Council is separately authorized, by Chapter VI, to make nonbinding recommendations for dispute resolution.

7.

See UN ARMS EMBARGOES: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 2, at 3:

Decisions to impose, or more importantly not to impose arms embargoes, are
also largely guided by political considerations. Often the commercial, political
or other strategic interests of any one member of the UN Security Council
means a decision to impose an arms embargo on a particular regime or armed
group is not tabled or agreed.
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by a permanent bureaucratic organization, which would receive reports
about compliance from treaty nations9 and would act "as a repository for
and source of information on breaches of UN arms embargoes..

. o At

present, it is unclear whether the ATT would be administered by an
institution within the U.N. structure or by an independent entity. The
ATT body could recommend that the Security Council impose a new
embargo, or (less likely) the ATT body might have the authority to
impose an embargo itself.
A.

How Many Embargoesare Needed?

For purposes of Section A, let us hypothesize that, one way or
another, the ATT body gets all the embargoes that are appropriate. That
is, the various delegates of the ATT governing body put aside their own
governments' interests and vote for embargoes whenever appropriate,
even against military allies or important trading partners of their own
nations. Then the embargo goes into legal effect, either because the ATT
body can impose the embargo or because the U.N. Security Council
always imposes embargoes that are recommended by the ATT.
Presumably the Security Council delegates-especially including all five
permanent members of the Security Council-will rise above their
national interests and vote in favor of whatever the ATT body claims is
required by international law.
One can search the history of the Security Council, and of every
global treaty governing body, and one would have great difficulty
finding isolated examples of such selfless behavior. If finding isolated
examples is like looking for a needle in a haystack, finding in a U.N.
treaty body, or in the Security Council, such selflessness as the
predominant standard of behavior is like looking for a haystack made of
golden needles. It is possible to imagine that such a thing could exist,
but no such thing has ever been known to exist in real life.
However, the ATT proponents are promising, in effect, that their
new treaty body will be the haystack of golden needles. They are
claiming, after all, that one result of an ATT will be a global arms
embargo against Israel." Never mind that both of the two most powerful
8.
ELIZABETH KIRKHAM, SAFERWORLD, MAKING IT WORK: MONITORING AND
VERIFYING IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ARMS TRADE TREATY 4.1 (2008), available at

http://kmsl.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/56372/ipublicationdocument singledocu
ment/7BDA5BCB-Al9A-4080-Al63-568EEC771Bl7/en/makingitwork.pdf.
9. Id. at 3.1.
10. Id. at iv.
11. International Action Network on Small Arms, Gaza: An ATT would reduce
civilian casualties, http://www.iansa.org/regions/nafrica/gaza-att09.htm (last visited Oct.
5, 2009); CONTROL ARMS, ARMS WITHOUT BORDERS: WHY A GLOBALISED TRADE NEEDS
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U.N. members would be extremely unlikely to agree: the United States
has a long-standing special relationship with Israel and China carries on
a thriving arms trade with Israel. The United Kingdom's relationship
with Israel has also been generally friendly, and the U.K., too, holds a
Security Council veto.
Imagining that an ATT would work as it is supposed to also requires
the fantastic assumption that China itself would be subjected to an
embargo. Arms in the hands of Chinese military are used for the
suppression of human rights in China, which is why the U.S. and the
European Union (E.U.) have restricted arms sales to China ever since the
Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989.12 Other than domestic repression,
the main use of the Chinese military has been to threaten and bully
democratic Taiwan-and a violent attempt to conquer Taiwan would be
contrary to the U.N.'s founding purpose of safeguarding peace. Thirdly,
as will be detailed below, China has made itself into an international
weapons supermarket for third-world tyrants and has repeatedly flouted
international law and U.N. embargoes in doing so. If, as ATT
proponents promise, arms sales to human rights violators will be
prevented by the Arms Trade Treaty, then China would have to be near
the top of the list for countries to be embargoed. Search the records of
every U.N. body in this century and see how many-if any-instances
you can find of any such body taking an action that was strongly opposed
by China.
Putting the China issue aside, the ATT, if it works as its proponents
promise, would lead to dozens of new arms embargoes, including
embargoes for almost all African nations; significantly, about half of the
embargo targets already have a domestic arms industry.13 Let us now
examine the scope of the necessary embargoes.
Small arms control proponents have accurately pointed out that
embargoes often fail because at-risk states have not been prevented from
obtaining stockpiles of weapons early on, before the Security Council
GLOBAL CONTROLS (Oct. 2, 2006), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/
nov/arms-without-borders.pdf.
12. KRISTIN ARCHICK, RiCHARD F. GRIMMETr, SHIRLEY KAN, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, EUROPEAN UNION'S ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA: IMPLICATIONS AND
OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY I (Jan. 26, 2006), available at http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/
other/RL32870.pdf.
13. We cross-referenced the list of arms-producing countries published by SMALL
ARMS SURVEY 2002, infra note 29, at 57, against the list of countries that were
embargoed as of 2007, either by the U.N. or the E.U., as listed by Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), available at http://archives.sipri.org/
contents/armstrad/embargoes.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). The six embargoed
countries that produced arms were North Korea, China, Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, and
Zimbabwe. The six embargoed countries that did not produce arms were Cote d'Ivoire,
the DRC, Lebanon, Liberia, Somalia, and Uzbekistan.
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has imposed an embargo. 14 Thus, the proponents suggest preventing
weapons transfers "if they . .. are likely to be used for serious violations
of human rights. . . ."" The standard is similar to "preventive detention."
That is, an embargo would not be imposed after a nation has used arms
to perpetrate abuses; instead, the embargo would be imposed
prospectively, once the ATT body decides that imported arms "are
likely" to be used to abuse human rights.
ATT advocates recognize that embargoes must be imposed in a nondiscriminatory manner. As Paul Cornish wrote:
the economic and social underdevelopment of a country might
become grounds on which to discriminate against that country in
matters of security and defence imports. It will be essential for the
credibility of the ATT to avoid the charge of discrimination, and to
avoid the impression that ATT participants are a cartel which has
arrogated to itself the authority to direct weaker states in matters of
sovereign national policy. 16
So let us examine how many nations would need to be embargoed,
based on neutral, non-discriminatory rules and taking into account the
ATT's preventive principle. A panel of experts designated as the
executor of an ATT would need to assess the stability of countries in
order to determine which countries would be most likely to:
(1) use weapons against civilian populations,
(2) create regional instability, and
(3) resell the weapons to countries that would be likely to commit
either of the aforementioned acts.
How do you identify countries that would be "likely" to commit
human rights abuses? J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted
Robert Gurr coined the term "conflict syndrome" for "high risk states"14. See UN ARMS EMBARGOES: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 2, at 1 ("Such embargoes
are usually late and blunt instruments, and the UN Sanctions Committees, which oversee
the embargoes, have to rely largely on Member States to monitor and implement them.");
see also Dominic Tierney, Irrelevant or malevolent? UN arms embargoes in civil wars,
31 REV. OF INT'L STUD. 645, 651 (2005) ("There is not a single case where an arms
embargo was introduced sufficiently early to prevent the aggressor faction from actually
initiating civil war.").
15. See TOWARDS AN ATT, supra note 2, at 4 (emphasis in original); see also DAVID
CORTRIGHT & GEORGE A. LOPEZ, WITH LINDA GERBER, PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES,
SANCTIONS SANS COMMITMENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF UN ARMS EMBARGOES 8-9 (May
2002), available at http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/WorkingPapers/wp022.pdf ("An

earlier and more effective effort to cut off the supply of arms ... might have made a
difference in preventing or at least reducing the scale of subsequent military hostilities.").
16. CORNISH, supra note 2, at 1 27.
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meaning "simultaneously politically unstable, challenged by rebels and
terrorists, tempted to resort to mass killings of civilians, and enmeshed in
international crises."l 7 As other scholars have observed, "massive
human rights violations ... are typically associated with state
breakdown." 18 In fact, "[s]eventy-seven percent of all international
crises in the post-Cold War era (1990-2005) include one or more actors
classified as unstable, fragile, or failed at the time of the crisis. . . ."9
Hewitt's Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger 20 provides a
sophisticated quantification of factors that predict with a high level of
confidence the risk of a country's instability. The methodology is based
on factors that include "the incoherence of the governing regime, high
infant mortality rates, lack of integration with the global economy, the
militarization of society, and the presence of armed conflict in
neighboring states." 2 1 The Instability Ledger offers a statistical
confidence range for each of the 160 countries examined.22 The table
that Hewitt constructed was the most highly developed we could find in
the literature.
Hewitt suggested a risk ratio of greater than 7.3 for classifying a
country as high risk.23 Of the 160 countries studied, Hewitt found forty
of them to be high risk.2 4 A risk ratio between 3.56 and 7.3 indicated a
country at moderate risk, and a country below 3.56-such as the U.S.was at low risk.25
17. J. JOSEPH HEwITT, JONATHAN WILKENFELD, & TED ROBERT GURR, PEACE AND
CONFLICT 2008, at 4 (2008).
18. See DANIEL C. ESTY, JACK A. GOLDSTONE, TED ROBERT GURR, PAMELA T. SuRKO
& ALAN N. UNGER, WORKING PAPERS: STATE FAILURE TASK FORCE REPORT 1 (Nov. 30,

1995), availableat http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/SFTF Phase I Report.pdf.
19. See Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Unstable States and InternationalCrises, in HEwITT,
WILKENFELD & GURR, supra note 17, at 67, 68.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 15-20.
23. Id. at 9-10. A risk ratio is defined by the authors as:
[T]he likelihood of future instability in a country.. .. The risk ratio gives the
relative risk of instability in a country compared to the average estimated
likelihood of instability for 28 member countries of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The member states of the
OECD were selected as a baseline because the organization's membership is
widely viewed as representing the most politically stable countries in the world
.... The risk ratio for any country is computed by dividing that country's
estimated probability for future instability by the baseline OECD probability of
0.003. Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
24. Id. at 15-20.
25. Id. at 17, 20 n.8. As with most exercises in quantitative political science, the
metrics are not perfectly predictive. Over the long term, about two-thirds of the at-risk
states do fail, but this means that one third do not. Moreover, there is a rate of
approximately one regime crisis annually among the states that were not identified as atrisk. See ESTY ET AL., supra note 18, at ix.
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We compared arms-producing countries with the countries Hewitt
designated as at risk of state failure. According to the 2002 Small Arms
Survey (SAS), there are ninety-eight arms-producing countries in the
world.26 As of 2009, there are 195 independent states,2 7 so about half of
all nations are arms producers.
Of the forty high-risk countries identified by Hewitt, fourteen of
them are weapons producers, according to SAS. 2 8 Of the forty mediumrisk countries, twenty-six are arms producing countries.29 Thus, exactly
half of the at-risk countries manufacture their own weapons.

26.

GRADUATE INST. OF INT'L STUDIES, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2002: COUNTING THE

HUMAN COST 9 (2002).
27. See Matt Rosenberg, The Number of Countries in the World, Mar. 18, 2008,
ABOUT.COM, availableat http://geography.about.com/cs/countries/a/numbercountries.htm
(last visited Oct. 5, 2009) ("A very frequent geographical question is 'How many
countries are in the world?' Different numbers pop up when one inquires or reads about
the number of countries in the world. Each source you use often yields a different
answer. Ultimately, the best answer is that there are 195 countries in the world."). The
U.S. Department of State counts 194. See U.S. Dep't of State, Independent States in the
World, July 29, 2009, available at http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm (last visited
Oct. 5, 2009). However, for reasons of realpolitik, the State Department pretends that
Taiwan is not a de facto state, id., despite the fact that it possesses all the standard
attributes of statehood, including a defined territory, a government that exercises
effective control over that territory, and the demonstrated capacity to enter into relations
with other states. If we count realistically, rather than on the basis of State Department
fictions, 195 appears to be the correct total.
28. Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Ethiopia,
Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iraq, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania.
29. Albania, Algeria, Cameroon, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Guinea, Indonesia, North Korea, Mexico, Moldova, Myanmar, Nepal,
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sudan,
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Former Republic of Yugoslavia.
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Other human rights groups 30 have constructed lists of countries that
are committing human rights abuses and are at risk of political instability

30. E.g. Human Rights Watch, About Us, http://www.hrw.org/en/about (last visited
Oct. 6, 2009) ("By focusing international attention where human rights are violated, we
give voice to the oppressed and hold oppressors accountable for their crimes."); Amnesty
Int'l, Who We Are, http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2009)
("Amnesty International is a worldwide movement of people who campaign for
internationally recognized human rights for all."); International Crisis Group, About
Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=208&l=1 (last visited Oct.
6, 2009) ("The International Crisis Group is now generally recognised as the world's
leading independent, non-partisan, source of analysis and advice to governments, and
intergovernmental bodies like the United Nations, European Union and World Bank, on
the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict."); Genocide Watch, About Genocide
Watch, http://www.genocidewatch.org/aboutus.html
(last visited Oct. 6, 2009)
("Genocide Watch exists to predict, prevent, stop, and punish genocide and other forms
of mass murder."); World Bank, The worldwide governance indicators project:
the
critics,
http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=
Answering
64165259&piPK=64165421&theSitePK=469372&menuPK=64216926&entitylD=00001
6406_20070223093027 (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) ("The Worldwide Governance
Indicators, reporting estimates of six dimensions of governance for over 200 countries
between 1996 and 2005, have become widely used among policymakers and
academics."); Universal Human Rights Index of United Nations Documents,
http://www.universalhumanrightsindex.org/en/about.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2009)
("The Universal Human Rights Index (Index) is designed primarily to facilitate access to
human rights documents issued by the UN human rights treaty bodies and the special
procedures of the Human Rights Council."); CIRI Human Rights Data Project,
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2009):
The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset contains standardsbased quantitative information on government respect for 15 internationally
recognized human rights for 195 countries, annually from 1981-2007. It is
designed for use by scholars and students who seek to test theories about the
causes and consequences of human rights violations, as well as policy makers
and analysts who seek to estimate the human rights effects of a wide variety of
institutional changes and public policies including democratization, economic
aid, military aid, structural adjustment, and humanitarian intervention.
See also Freedom House, About Us, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=2
(last visited Oct. 6, 2009):
Freedom House is a clear voice for democracy and freedom around the world.
Since its founding in 1941 by prominent Americans concerned with the
mounting threats to peace and democracy, Freedom House has been a vigorous
proponent of democratic values and a steadfast opponent of dictatorships of the
far left and the far right.
See also Mo Ibrahim Foundation, South Africa outpaces North Africa in governance
performance, at 2 (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/
media/get/20091004_2009-ibrahim-index-of-african-govemance-global-news-release.pdf
(last visited Nov. 10, 2009):
The Ibrahim Index of African Governance was created in recognition of the
need for a robust, comprehensive and quantifiable tool for citizens and civil
society to track government performance in Africa. The development of the
Ibrahim Index reflects the Foundation's long-term commitment to support
African ownership of the governance debate, to develop capacity in African
institutions, and to improve the quality, reliability, and availability of data
about Africa.
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and civil strife. In 2005, Human Rights Watch (HRW) singled out sixtyeight countries that the organization considered to be human rights
abusers. 3
These countries were not always the same countries that
Hewitt placed on his high- or medium-risk list for state failure. For
example, HRW identified the United States as a human rights abuser,32
and Hewitt determined that the U.S. was at an extremely low risk for
state failure. 33
We combined the countries listed by HRW as human rights abusers
and those listed by Hewitt as at medium- and high-risk for state failure.
Thirty-nine countries were on both lists, 34 and 109 countries were on at
least one list. 3 5 When we cross-referenced the 109 problematic
countrieS36 with the SAS list of arms-producing countries, we found that
sixty-one of those 109 countries produced weapons.
In 2005, there were twenty-five areas of major conflict around the
globe," with more conflicts erupting.38 Since there are already twenty-

31. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2006: EVENTS OF 2005 (2006).
HRW put the European Union on its human rights abuse list, but to avoid confusion, we
did not count it, and instead just counted the particular E.U. nations that HRW listed.
32. See id. at 502.
33.

HEWITT, WILKENFELD, & GuRR, supra note 17, at 17. They determined that the

U.S. had a risk score of 1,0.
34. Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia,
Colombia, C6te d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia,
Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Liberia, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, North
Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, and Venezuela.
35. Of the sixty-eight countries on HRW's list of abusers, twenty-nine were not on
Hewitt's list of at-risk for instability. Of those twenty-nine, twenty-one were arms
producers, according to the Small Arms Survey 2002 listing. These are Argentina,
Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Chile, China, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Israel,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, United Arab
Emirates, United States, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.
36. Those 109 problematic countries were a compilation of Hewitt's at-risk countries
and Human Rights Watch's countries that were listed as human rights abusers in 2005,
cited in HRW's 2006 World Report., supra note 31.
37. See J. Joseph Hewitt, Trends in Global Conflict, 1946-2005, in HEWITT,
WILKENFELD, & GURR, supra note 17, at 21, 23. Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan,
Burundi, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, India (three separate conflicts), Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Myanmar (Burma) (two separate conflicts), Nepal, Philippines (two separate
conflicts), Russia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, and the United States.
38. See HEWITT, WILKENFELD, & GURR, supra note 17, at 1 ("Has the magnitude of
armed conflict declined? The answer is yes when judged by falling numbers of internal
wars and their average death-tolls across the last 20 years. But when we tabulate the
number of states engaged in armed conflicts, either their own or multilateral wars as in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the long-run trend is up."); cf Hewitt, supra note 37, at 21 ("Still,
there is indirect evidence suggesting that new conflicts may be erupting at a slower
pace.").
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five conflicts, worldwide, but only ten extant U.N. embargoes,39 we
would need several more embargoes just to close the gap. We would
need still more embargoes to prevent countries that might soon be at war
from building up arsenals.
Besides the countries at near-term risk of conflict, there is the
separate problem of countries (e.g., Zimbabwe) that have sometimes
peaceful relations with their neighbors, but are at high risk of using arms
for domestic violations of human rights. This list would include, at the
least, the countries that are already identified as human rights abusers
and are at high risk of instability. If the ATT panel were cautious
enough to also embargo human rights violators that are at medium risk of
instability, then we find that much of Africa needs to be embargoed,4 0 in
contravention to Cornish's admonition that counseled against creating
the appearance of discrimination.4 1
Thus, if the ATT is implemented as its proponents insist that it must
be (proactive embargoes against the possibility of "likely" violations of
human rights and embargoes based on neutral criteria), then the ATT
must immediately lead to, at the very least, dozens of new arms
embargoes.
Significantly, half or more of the new embargo targets already have
their own domestic arms industries. Banning arms imports will not be
effective if a country can produce arms itself. Hence, the import of raw
materials or arms components would also have to be embargoed, vastly
expanding the necessary scope of the embargo-and the attendant
difficulties of enforcement-all the more so since many arms
components or materials have dual uses, and the importing nation could
claim that the imports were for civilian use.
Moreover, at least for firearms, stopping local manufacture by a
determined government would be essentially impossible. For example,
in Ghana, the British colonial regime banned firearms manufacture, in
order to make resistance to colonialism more difficult. 42 The post-

39. See Stockholm Int'l Peace Research Inst., International Arms Transfers,
http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/embargoes.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
Target: Taliban, Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden; Cote d'Ivoire; DRC (rebels); Iran
(technology related to nuclear weapon delivery systems); Lebanon (non-government
forces); Liberia; North Korea (DPRK); Sierra Leone (rebels); Somalia; and Sudan
(Darfur region).
40. See HEWITT, WILKENFELD, & GURR, supra note 17, at 15, 17 (list of countries at
risk). Those countries are, in Sub-Saharan Africa: Cape Verde, Congo (Brazzaville),
Gabon, Gambia, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. In North Africa, they are Egypt,
Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.
41. See Comish, supra note 2, at 124.
42. Emmanuel Addo Sowatey, Small arms proliferation and regional security in
West Africa: The Ghanaian case, in I NEWS FROM THE NoRDic AFR. INST. 6, 6 (Nordiska
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colonial government did the same, and, several years ago, signed a U.N.backed regional treaty that bans firearms manufacture throughout
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). 4 3 Yet Ghana
has a thriving firearms manufacturing business, and local gunsmiths can
even produce working copies of the AK-47 rifle. Using little more than
"a pair of bellows to fan the fire, a hammer, and an iron pipe," an
individual Ghanaian gunsmith can produce several guns per day;
collectively, they produce about a hundred thousand per year.4 4
Firearms manufacture is not rocket science. It is possible to imagine
an international arms control regime that makes it impossible for
underdeveloped countries to acquire the technology to produce
intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is preposterous to imagine that
international embargoes can prevent governments from being able to
manufacture firearms. If Ghanaian blacksmiths-evading decades of
national prohibition by operating "in forests, farms and many other
secluded places" 4 5-can produce a hundred thousand guns per year, then
any government in the world would be able to develop its own firearms
manufacturing capability, if it chose to do so.
Accordingly, the notion that an international arms embargo against
a government that violates human rights could deprive that government
of firearms, even if all other nations complied with the embargo, is
extremely implausible. To the contrary, embargoes that stimulate
domestic production can contribute, in the long run, to international arms
proliferation: "[T]he great irony that a country that built up its arms
capacity to counter an international embargo, as South Africa did,
celebrated its freedom from pariah status by using that capacity to plunge
into export sales."4 6
B.

State Sovereignty and Treaty Enforcement

It was apparent early in the ATT process that, while nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were concerned about a reduction in

Afrikainstitutet 2005), available at http://www.nai.uu.se/publications/news/documents/
news1 2005.pdf.
43. Id. at 6.
44. Id. at 8.
45. Id.
46. R. T. NAYLOR, WAGES OF CRIME: BLACK MARKETS, ILLEGAL FINANCE, AND THE
UNDERWORLD ECONOMY 130 (2002).
On the International Court of Justice (the U.N.'s "world court," ICJ), see Hurst
Hannum, Fact-Finding by Nongovernmental Human Rights Organizations, in FACTFINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 294 (Richard Lillich ed. 1992) (arguing that
the ICJ is too slow and remote to deal effectively with complicated fact patterns
involving violations of human rights).
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total violence, states were concerned about their sovereignty.4
as 2003, HRW noted:
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As early

[G]overnments have generally conceived the problem narrowly as
one of national security rather than human security. They largely
have focused attention on the action of private arms traffickers,
deflecting their own responsibility. A human rights approach to
small arms, by contrast, puts people at the center of the analysis and
highlights that it is up to governments to take action to respond to the
small arms problem.
If U.N. member governments sign a treaty that they believe is
potentially damaging to their sovereignty-even though that treaty would
be very beneficial to the global population-they may not fulfill their
obligations needed to make the treaty succeed.
By January 2008, ninety-eight member states had provided input to
the U.N. concerning their views on an ATT.49 Sarah Parker, a researcher
at the Small Arms Survey in Geneva, organized those reports and wrote
two papers summarizing and categorizing the information.o
One
recurring concern was the right of the state to possess self-defense arms
under an ATT. Unwilling to cede additional sovereignty via an ATT,
"[f]ifty-two states made a specific request that the inherent right to selfdefence enshrined by Article 51 of the UN Charter be referred to in a
treaty." 52

47. See G.A. Res. 61/89, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/89 (Dec. 18, 2006) ("Towards an
arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and
transfer of conventional arms"). At the time the resolution was passed, the U.N. asked
for input from member states concerning their views about an ATT. See Parker,supra
note 2, at 1.
48. See Human Rights Watch, Small Arms and Human Rights: The Need for Global
Action, Briefing Paper for the U.N. Biennial Meeting on Small Arms, July 7, 2003, at 12,
available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/small-arms-070703.pdf, see also
AMNESTY INT'L, A GLOBAL ARMS TRADE TREATY: WHAT STATES WANT 1 (Oct. 2007),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL34/004/2007/en/dom-POL
34004 2007en.pdf.
49. See PARKER, supra note 2, at 1.
50. See SARAH PARKER, U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, ANALYSIS OF
STATES'
VIEWS ON
AN ARMS
TRADE TREATY
(Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/2411122/Analysis-of-States-Views-on-an-Arms-TradeTreaty; see also PARKER, supra note 2.
51. See PARKER,supra note 50; see also PARKER, supra note 2.
52. See PARKER, supra note 50, at § 3.4.1. The U.N. Charter states: "Nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
U.N. Charter art. 51,
chapter7.shtml.
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States also expressed concern about their right to manufacture arms:
"44 states sought to include a reference to the right of states to
manufacture, import, export, transfer and possess conventional weapons
for self-defence, security or participation in peacekeeping operations."53
Recognition of such a government "right" to manufacture or trade
arms would be a human rights catastrophe. Consider, for example,
Zimbabwe. China has prevented the imposition of a U.N. embargo on
Zimbabwe,5 4 but the E.U. has imposed its own embargo. 5 Under an
ATT, Zimbabwe would argue that: (1) the Zimbabwe government has an
internationally recognized "right" to arms; (2) the ATT enforcement
body has refused (thanks to pressure from China) to impose an arms
embargo on Zimbabwe; (3) therefore, an arms embargo by the E.U., or
anyone else, is a violation of Zimbabwe's "rights" under international
law and is void.
Unsurprisingly, because the push for the ATT is the product of gun
prohibition NGOs, the ATT does not even acknowledge the existence of
the personalright of arms, even though that right is explicitly guaranteed
by several national constitutions (United States, Mexico, Haiti, and
Guatemala). Nor does the draft ATT acknowledge the rights of personal
self-defense, the right to resist tyranny, and the right of security in the
home (which implies a right to resist unlawful home invasions), though
56
these rights are guaranteed by dozens of national constitutions. Thus,
the ATT's willful blindness towards personal rights, combined with its
53.

See PARKER, supra note 50, at § 3.4.1.

54.
PAUL HOLTOM & NOEL KELLY, STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., SIPRI
YEARBOOK 2009, at app. 12A, available at http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/12/12A.

55. Id.
56. See David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, The Human Right of SelfDefense, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 43, 137-47 (2007):
Right of self-defense: Antigua & Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cyprus,
Grenada, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Malta, Nigeria, Peru, Samoa, St. Kitts and Nevis,
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Slovakia, and Zimbabwe.
Right to resist tyranny: Andorra, Argentina, Congo, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras,
Hungary, Lithuania, Mauritania, Peru, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia.
Right of security in the home: Afghanistan, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, China, Congo, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Germany, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana,
Honduras, Hong Kong, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon,
Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mongolia, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Niger, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, St.
Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Slovakia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea,
Spain, Suriname, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Obviously many of the governments of the above countries do not obey the
requirements of their own constitutions-a fact that casts further doubt on their
willingness to adhere to international arms control treaties.
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invention of government rights, would serve to undermine any arms
embargo imposed outside the ATT process itself.
While the ATT submissions indicated that states were worried about
weapons transfers that aid human rights violators, the states showed
strong desire to maintain their sovereignty and their safety from rogue
nations.58
Significantly, "[m]any submissions stated that national
implementation must remain the sole responsibility of each member state
and that final decisions regarding the authorization of each transaction
must lie within the competence of each state party."59
But of course such decision-making would make the ATT nearly
worthless. If each state is the authority for the legality of its actions
under the ATT, then the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe can simply
declare that it has a wonderful record on human rights and that it never
uses arms to violate human rights. China can then accept as binding
Zimbabwe's self-declaration and continue to supply arms to the Mugabe
thugocracy. Quite understandably, the NGO advocates of the ATT want
much stronger limitations on arms transfers than many individual states

do. 60
Amnesty International declares:
"States shall not authorise
international transfers of arms or ammunition that violate their expressed
obligations under international law," 6 1 "[s]tates shall not authorise
international transfers of arms or ammunition where they will be used or

57. See PARKER, supra note 2, at § 8.3 ("Consideration of the possibility that arms
transferred might be used to violate international humanitarian law (IHL) was the second
most frequently suggested criterion by states.").
58. See id. at § 4 ("Other purposes attributed to an ATT by states included to prevent
diversion, to prevent proliferation, to induce transparency, to prevent the destabilizing
accumulation of arms, to prevent misuse and to prevent illegal transfers."); AMNESTY
INT'L, A GLOBAL ARMS TRADE TREATY, supra note 48, at 26:

[M]any states agreed that one of the criterion to be included in assessing
transfers is whether there will be a violation of UN Charter principles including
the prohibition against the use or threat of force and the prohibition against
intervening in the domestic affairs of other states, enshrined in Articles 2(4)
and 2(7). These are key provisions in the UN's mandate to maintain
international peace and security and form cornerstones of the UN Charter.
59.

See AMNESTY INT'L, A GLOBAL ARMS TRADE TREATY, supra note 48, at 24

(internal citation omitted).
60.

See HILDE WALLACHER & CLARE DA SILVA, INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST.,

PROGRESSING TOWARDS AN ARMS TRADE TREATY 24 (July 7, 2008) ("The importance of

linking the work of an ATT to a human rights framework is evident from the historical
record, which reveals connections between the arms trade and gross violations of human
rights.").
61.

3

See AMNESTY INT'L, COMPILATION OF GLOBAL PRINCIPLES FOR ARMS TRANSFERS

(2006)

[hereinafter

COMPILATION

OF

GLOBAL

PRINCIPLES]

available

http://www.amnesty.org/enlibrary/asset/POL34/003/2007/en/dom-POL34003
2007en.pdf.

at
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are likely to be used for violations of international law.. .,"62 and
"[s]tates shall take into account other factors, including the likely use of
the arms or ammunition, before authorising an arms transfer. ... "
Control Arms points out that already "[t]here is also a universal
obligation on States to ensure respect for the rules of international
humanitarian law. Without the inclusion of these elementary principles
an ATT will simply not be effective."64
But whatever the ATT says that states "shall" do, the ATT will be
futile if "shall" means nothing more than "states shall, based solely on
their own determination of their obligations. . . ."

As of mid-2009, the draft ATT would require states to submit
annual reports about their compliance to an ATT review panel, similar to
the panels that exist for other human rights treaties. The ATT panel
could, in theory, declare that a state's report was false or incomplete and
could announce that a state was in violation of the ATT. As with other
human rights treaties (discussed below), the ATT panel would be able to
do nothing more than write some stern words of criticism.
In contrast, the U.N. Security Council has enormous tools at its
disposal to enforce its embargoes. The Security Council can authorize or
order member states to use force against embargo violators. The ATT
panel, on the other hand, could, at most, ask the Security Council to do
something. So an ATT embargo would add no coercive force (and
would indeed usually have less coercive force) than a Security Council
embargo.
In terms of enforcement power against sovereign states, the ATT
would be a considerable step down from a Security Council embargo.
Human rights violators might prefer to operate in an ATT world. When
human rights advocates call for an embargo against a government that
uses small arms to violate human rights, the government (and its allies)
could urge the Security Council to avoid the issue and to let the ATT
panel take the lead. The result would be a sham embargo, with no
enforcement other than the ATT panel's reports describing violations.
Already the international arms control process has shown the
enormous gap between "states shall . . ." and "states actually will. . .. "

Consider the issue of transparency.

62. Id. at 4.
63. Id. at 5.
64. See ARMS TRADE TREATY STEERING COMMITTEE, ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY,
SCOPE AND PARAMETERS OF AN ARMS TRADE TREATY (ATT): AN NGO PERSPECTIVE 1
(2007), available at https://www.controlarms.org/peoples-consultation/documents/ATT
%20position%20paper/o20designed%20exec%20summary.pdf; see also WALLACHER &
DA SILVA, supra note 60, at 24 (For an ATT, "international human rights law is seen as
the most important criterion ... )
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Compilation of Global Principlesfor Arms Transfers 65 was written
by the Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee, comprised of NGOs."
According to Principle 5: "States shall submit comprehensive national
annual reports on all their international arms and ammunition transfers to
an international registry, which shall publish a compiled, comprehensive,
international annual report. Such reports should cover the international
transfer of all conventional arms and ammunition including small arms
and light weapons."67
Yet states are already rejecting transparency. 68 The U.N. currently
maintains a Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA). At present, the
UNROCA does not mandate reports on small arms, but states can
voluntarily submit small arms information to UNROCA. 69 Although
thirty-seven African states have stated that they wish to create SALW
transparency in order to control SALW proliferation, only four have
reported to UNROCA. 70
The gap between what member state
delegations announce at the U.N. and what member state governments
actually do is enormous.
C.

Dictatorshipsand Human Rights Treaty Compliance

The mantra of ATT advocates is that the ATT would create globally
binding arms embargoes, which under international law, all nations (or at
least all signatories to the ATT) would be required to obey.
But what the ATT proponents tend to elide is whether the signatory
nations would obey. Among free nations, such as those of the E.U.,
65. COMPILATION OF GLOBAL
66. Id.
67. Id. at 6.

PRINCIPLES,

supra note 61.

68. See EDWARD J. LAURANCE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INT'L TRADE CANADA, THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONAL ARMS REGISTER (UNCAR): PRESENT CHALLENGES,

NEW DIRECTIONS (2001), available at http://www.intemational.gc.ca/arms-armes/isropprisi/research-recherche/verification/laurance200 1/index.aspx.
69. The seven UNROCA categories are battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles,
large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles
and missile launchers.

See PAUL HOLTOM, STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST.,

TRANSPARENCY IN TRANSFERS OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS, REPORTS TO THE

UNITED NATIONS REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS, 2003-2006, at 52-53 (2008),

available at http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP22.pdf
70. See HOLTOM, supra note 69, at 49; see also Bjbrn Hagelin, Mark Bromley &
Siemon T. Wezeman, International Arms Transfers, in SIPRI YEARBOOK 2006,
ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 449, 471 (2006).

In the

context of the seven UNROCA categories, Hagelin, Bromley and Wezeman state: "There
are signs of political fatigue with regard to UNROCA reporting, visible even among
some strong supporters of the principle of transparency in arms transfer." Id.
Among the reasons for refusal to submit information could be reluctance to reveal
data regarding a state's military expenditures versus the total budget, or the state's
potential military weakness.
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compliance with international human rights obligations is generally
good. In free nations, there is a tendency for the public and for
government officials to value the rule of law-that is, for the government
itself to be bound by the law. A free press and a political system
somewhat responsive to public demands combine to create pressure for
the government to live up to its international humanitarian law
obligations. Accordingly, an ATT might be expected to affect the
behavior of free nations.
However, as we shall see below in the case studies of Zimbabwe
and the DR Congo, the major arms sources for human rights violators
tend to be dictatorial governments or smugglers who operate with the
covert tolerance of such governments. Would these governments comply
with ATT legal obligations?
The record suggests that many of these governments would sign and
ratify the ATT without the slightest intent of compliance. In the article
International Human Rights Law and the Politics of Legitimation:
Repressive State and Human Rights Treaties, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton,
Kiyoteru Tsutsui, and John W. Meyer performed a quantitative study of
human rights treaty ratification by repressive governments. 7 1 The
authors studied seven treaties: the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC);
and the Convention on the Protections of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of the Families (MWC).72
They found that repressive governments were at least as likely as
were free governments to ratify human rights treaties.
Particularly
likely to sign were repressive regimes that were autonomous; that is, the
regimes had such dominance over civil society that they had no worries
that ratification of an international treaty might provide a useful talking
point for domestic dissidents.74

71. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Kiyoteru Tsutsui & John W. Meyer, International
Human Rights Law and the Politics ofLegitimation: Repressive States and Human Rights
Treaties, 23 INT'L Soc. 115 (2008).
72. Id. at 118 tab. 1.
73. Id. at 123.
74. Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui & Meyer, supra note 71, at 124.
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For example, Saudi Arabia, with a thoroughly unfree and
misogynist government, has ratified the CEDAW.15 Apparently the
Saudi government did not worry that CEDAW would provide
ammunition for Saudi feminists to criticize Saudi government practices,
since feminist speech is so utterly suppressed.
In contrast, the government of Malaysia is repressive but not
autonomous; accordingly, the government has refrained from ratifying
certain human rights treaties for fear that they might provide arguments,
which could be deployed by domestic opposition groups.
Notably, China has ratified five of the above seven treaties and has
signed the other two. 7 6 Yet China is in flagrant violation of every one of
them, except for CEDAW.n China also happens to be a massive arms
exporter, particularly to human rights violators.78 ATT proponents have
yet to explain why China, assuming it ratified the ATT, would obey the
ATT even though China routinely and massively violates other human
rights treaties it has ratified.
The authors conclude that repressive regimes, especially
autonomous regimes, ratify human rights treaties as an easy means of
acquiring some global legitimacy, even though the regimes know that
they are unwilling or unable to comply with the treaties.79
China also has an established record of violating the arms control
agreements to which it purports to adhere. In a 2005 report on
implementation of the Programme of Action from the U.N.'s 2001 small
arms conference, China described its arms export policies as "cautious

75.

Advocates Call for For Senate Ratification Of CEDAW, Commemorate

International Women's Day, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY,

Mar. 10, 2009, available at

http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/141624.php (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
76. Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, & Meyer, supra note 71, at 119.
77. See, e.g., FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2009: THE ANNUAL SURVEY
OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (2009); FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS 2009: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF MEDIA INDEPENDENCE (2009); Ashley Esarey,
FREEDOM HOUSE, SPEAK No EVIL: MASS MEDIA CONTROL IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA

(Feb. 2006), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/special-report/33.pdf.
78. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, Is Resisting
Genocide a Human Right?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1275, 1289 (2006); Arkar Moe,
Nobel Laureates Call for Arms Embargo on Burma, THE IRRAWADDY, May 22, 2009,
availableat http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?artid=15708.
79. For similar research, see James R. Katalikawe, Henry M. Onoria & Baker G.
Wairama, Crises and Conflicts in the African Great Lakes Region: The Problem of
Noncompliance with HumanitarianLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS:

CLOSING THE COMPLIANCE GAP 121 (Edward C. Luck & Michael W. Doyle eds., 2004)
(African governments ignore humanitarian international law, including the Geneva
Conventions); Jeffery Herbst, InternationalLaws of War and the African Child: Norms,
Compliance, and Sovereignty in id. at 185 (massive and widespread violations of the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child).
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and responsible."so Amnesty International pointed to China's record in
supplying arms to the dictatorships of Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sudan as
evidence of "a dangerously permissive approach."8 '
And lest one think that China is the only major power that violates
its arms control commitments, the sales of military and dual-use
equipment to China by firms in Canada, Russia, Europe, and the United
States appear to be violations of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies,
which was agreed to by the governments of the nations of the exporting
corporations.82
D.

Black Markets

Almost by definition,83 the extent of the black market in small arms
and light weapons is unknown. The International Institute of Strategic
Studies (IISS) suggests a figure of two to ten billion dollars (U.S.)
annually, while the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
places the annual figure at ten to fifteen billion dollars (U.S.). 8 4 In a
paper for the European Institute on Crime Prevention and Control, Peter
Lock suggested that more information about arms transfers is needed and
that governments need to intensify their efforts at supply-side control
because "[b]lack market networks appear to be able to deliver small
arms, if necessary in large quantity, whenever and where ever effective
demand articulates itself.""
But transparency of transfers could be difficult to achieve, and
counting on government efforts might be unrealistic. R.T. Naylor, a
professor of economics at McGill University in Canada, explains:
"Supplying countries hide their sales for political and financial reasons;
80. AMNESTY INT'L, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA SUSTAINING CONFLICT AND
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES: THE FLOW OF ARMS ACCELERATES 2 (June 11, 2006) [hereinafter
"AMNESTY INT'L, CHINA"] (quoting Report of China to the U.N. Programme of Action to
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All
Its Aspects, § 7 (June 23, 2005)).
81. AMNESTY INT'L, CHINA, supra note 80, at 2.

82.
83.

Id. at 30.
See R.T. Naylor, The Structure and Operation of the Modern Arms Black

Market, in LETHAL COMMERCE: THE GLOBAL TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT
WEAPONS 44, 45 (Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare & Laura W. Reed eds., 1995)
("Probably the simplest way to understand the essence of a black-market transaction,
then, is to recall that 'black' is not a color-it is the absence of light.").
84. See Peter Chalk, Light Arms Trading in SE Asia, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW,
Mar. 1, 2001, reprinted by Rand Corp., available at http://www.rand.org/commentary/

2001/03/01/JIR.html).
85. PETER LOCK, THE EUROPEAN INST. FOR CRIME PREVENTION & CONTROL,
PERVASIVE ILLICIT SMALL ARMS AVAILABILITY: A GLOBAL THREAT 15 (1999), available
at http://www.heuni.fiL/uploads/cu841.pdf.
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recipient countries hide their purchases, mainly for political reasons."
So, "[h]istorically, many, perhaps most, black-market deals had at least
the tacit agreement (and often the act of collaboration) of the intelligence
services of one or several states."87 Naylor concluded: "Attacking the
actual trafficking seems doomed to failure, given the frequent complicity
of governments and the sophistication of the machinery for covertly
moving weapons to market and moving the money back."88
ATT advocates promise that stronger controls and harsher sanctions
will halt the flow of weapons. But as Mois6s Naim, editor-in-chief of
Foreign Policy magazine, observes: "History and common sense say
that, in the long run, market forces tend to prevail over those of
governments ....

Today, conditions for trafficking are the best they

have ever been." 8 9 As Naim shows, prohibition failure is nothing new;
beginning in third century B.C., governments in China and Rome
imposed very high taxes on salt. 90 Yet despite harsh penalties, the
governments were unable to control the smugglers. 91 Much later, France
even imposed the death penalty and imprisoned thousands of people
every year for smuggling, which evaded the salt tax, but the government
was unable to suppress the black market for the white substance.92
Indeed, world history reveals no successful black market, including
one in arms, having been defeated by supply-side controls, and there is
86. See Naylor, supra note 83, at 44.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 55; see also Public Enquiry on Arms, VANGUARD (Lagos), Jan. 21,
2008, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200801220077.html("COURT martial of
15 soldiers, among them three colonels, two lieutenant colonels, one major and nine noncommissioned officers may just reveal a tip of the ease with which arms get into
unauthorised through official sources."); Ernest Mpinganjira, Illegal arms trade, THE
EAST AFRICAN STANDARD, July 3, 2005 ("A Ugandan national ... has revealed how gun
merchants keep the region's presidents, business tycoons and senior military officers on
their payroll .... The complex trafficking web has ensnared a leading Kenyan politician
who has run for the Presidency .

. ..

In its findings, IPIS [International Peace

Information Service] indicts the United Nations and the European Union for doing little
to stop the arms trade in the region despite knowing the governments, companies and
individuals . . . ."); Human Rights Watch, Liberia: Guinea FloutsArms Embargo, Nov. 5,
2003, reprinted in Global Policy Forum, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/
security/issues/liberia/2003/1105 flouts.htm ("Guinea's Ministry of Defense ordered
mortars and other ammunition from Iran and arranged their onward transport to LURD."
According to Lisa Misol, arms researcher with Human Rights Watch, "By supplying
munitions to the Liberian rebels, it not only breached an arms embargo, but also became
complicit in egregious violations of the laws of war." Id.).
89. Moists NAIM, ILLICIT: How SMUGGLERS, TRAFFICKERS, AND COPYCATS ARE
HIJACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 222-23 (2005).
90. Id. at 223.
9 1.
92.

Id.
MARK KURLANSKY,

SALT: A WORLD HISTORY 233 (2002) ("By the late
eighteenth century, more than 3,000 French men, women, and even children were
sentenced to prison or death every year for crimes against the gabelle.").
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no reason to believe that supply-side prohibitions on arms today will be
any more successful. 93
Demand-side reductions may be more successful at producing
disarmament. For example, if a government can provide effective
security in a region, the citizens may feel less need for their personal
defensive arms.94 Unlike ordinary peaceable citizens, governments and
warlords that violate human rights are implausible targets for demandside reduction. Warlords would not be warlords if they disarmed. 95
Tyrants, like Mugabe, would be overthrown if they gave up their
weapons.
ATT proponents do not explain how they intend to mete out
punishments or other sanctions that are sufficiently strong and certain in
order to shut down, or even significantly impair, the illicit trade that
supplies arms to tyrants, warlords, and other human rights violators.
It is possible to imagine that an ATT could lead to more embargoes
than does the current system of embargoes imposed by the U.N. Security
Council; after all, ATT embargoes, at least as conceived by some ATT
93. See R.T. NAYLOR, WAGES OF CRIME: BLACK MARKETS, ILLEGAL FINANCE, AND
THE UNDERWORLD ECONOMY 11 (2002) ("[N]ever in history has there been a black
market defeated from the supply side .... ); id. at 130 ("At all three levels of the supply
side-production of new equipment (primary), distribution of old stocks (secondary), and
dispersion of arms into the hands of the end-user population (tertiary)-the obstacles to
control are formidable."); see also Naylor, supra note 83, at 55 ("Attacking the actual
trafficking seems doomed to failure .... ).
94. See Jurgen Brauer & Robert Muggah, Completing the Circle: Building a Theory
of Small Arms Demand, 27 CONTEMP. SEC. POL'Y 138, 138-39 (2006), available at
http://www.contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/assets/CSP-27- 1-Muggah.pdf:
Much research, writing, and policymaking has been devoted to generating
awareness of, and responses to, the supply side of the small arms market, such
as export control regimes, weapon registries, and arms and ammunition
marking and tracing. It is hoped that by regulating the international and
regional supply of small arms, and by preventing or tracking illegal flows that
drift into open markets, arms acquisition and hence armed violence can be
reduced.
Yet a growing cadre of academics, practitioners, and policymakers question the
emphasis on the supply side and seek to examine and understand factors that
drive the demand side. For example, both the United Nations Programme of
Action (PoA) and the then-Organization of African Unity's Bamako
Declaration refer to a number of areas where demand reduction can be pursued.
While proposed interventions are vague and often amount to keeping the status
quo, they conclude that the promotion of security, conflict prevention and
resolution, crime prevention, and the promotion of health and development can
reduce people's desire to acquire (and ultimately use) small arms. Although a
discussion on small arms demand is thus launched, the majority of the policy
recommendations emerging from these and other texts continue to advance
predominantly supply-side oriented approaches to arms control.
95. Warlords can become interested in giving up their arms if they feel that they are
losing the war, and that they will be better off if they conclude a peace agreement sooner
rather than later. Some warlords in the DRC appear to have done so, at least partially.
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proponents, would not be subject to veto by the permanent members of
the Security Council. But it is difficult to see how an ATT embargo
could be enforced any more effectively than a Security Council embargo.
A Security Council resolution under Chapter VII is, after all, the most
powerful form of international law: a mandatory directive, which no
U.N. member state has the legal authority to avoid obeying and which is
not subject to the member state's own interpretation of its obligations.
Further, a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII necessarily has
the support (or at least the non-opposition) of the world's two most
powerful nations (the United States and China), plus Russia, France, and
the United Kingdom, all of which have extensive military operations in
foreign countries. If such a mass of power cannot make arms embargoes
effective against the black market, there is no reason to imagine that an
ATT, which would be backed up by nothing more than a nation's
willingness to comply with international law, would be more effective.
II.

ZIMBABWE

The government of Zimbabwe is precisely the kind of government
that should not be allowed to buy arms. During the most recent election,
which, like the one before that and the one before that, was stolen by
dictator Robert Mugabe, the government perpetrated extensive and oftenlethal violence against political opponents and against people who
protested the election fraud. 96
Arms in the hands of the Zimbabwe National Army, the Zimbabwe
Republic Police Force, the Central Intelligence Organisation, and youth
militias run by Mugabe's ZANU-PF party have been used to violently
suppress political opposition and to ensure the government's control of
the food supply. 97
This is nothing new; in mid-1983, the Army's Fifth Brigade, which
had been trained by North Koreans, carried out mass murder, rape,
torture, and kidnapping in Zimbabwe's Midlands and Matabeland." As
the United Nations reported, during the late twentieth and early twentyfirst century, Zimbabwe took advantage of the wars going on inside the

96. See Caroline Hawley, Witnesses describe Zimbabwe violence, BBC NEWS, June
10, 2008; Guy Lamb, Inst. for Sec. Studies, Seven Reasons to Impose an Arms Embargo
on Zimbabwe, ISS TODAY, July 16, 2008, available at http://www.issafrica.org/index.
php?linkjid=5&slink id=6291&linktype=12&slink-type=12&tmpl-id=3 (last visited
Oct. 14, 2009).
97. Peter Kagwanja, Zimbabwe's March 2005 Elections: Dangers and
Opportunities, 14 AFR. SEC. REV. 5, 7-8 (2005).
98. Brian Kagoro, The Prisoners of Hope: Civil Society and the Opposition in
Zimbabwe, 14 AFR. SEC. REv. 19, 22 (2005).
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Democratic Republic of the Congo to invade southern regions of the
DRC and loot the mineral wealth there.
Thanks to China, there is no U.N. Security Council embargo
targeting Zimbabwe. As The Guardian notes, "China has in the past
used its veto at the UN security council to prevent the Zimbabwe issue
from being raised, on the grounds that the country's problems were an
internal matter." 99
Nor is there an African Union embargo. There is an E.U. arms
embargo, but it is binding only on E.U. countries. 00
A.

South Africa's IllegalAssistance in Arms Transfers to Zimbabwe

A large supply of Chinese-made weapons, ordered in January 2008
by the Zimbabwe government, was shipped from China on March 15,
2008, arriving at the port of Durban, South Africa, a month later. 101
Despite an injunction from South Africa's High Court on April 18, 2008,
and South African Transport and Allied Workers Union's refusal to
unload the ship,10 2 South Africa's National Conventional Arms Control
Committee approved the transfer of arms through South Africa to
landlocked Zimbabwe.10 3 South African Secretary of Defence January
Masilela stated: "If the buyer is the Zimbabwean sovereign government

99. David Beresford, Chinese Ship Carries Arms Cargo to Mugabe Regime, THE
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 18, 2008; see also Lamb, supra note 96. In July 2008, despite
the violence surrounding Zimbabwe's presidential election, both China and Russia vetoed
another attempt by the U.N. Security Council to impose an arms embargo. Id.
100. See Stockholm Int'l Peace Research Inst., EU arms embargo on Zimbabwe,
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/researchissues/controlling/arms emba
rgoes/eu armsembargoes/zimbabwe/zimbabwe/?searchterm=zimbabwe embargo (last
visited Nov. 10, 2009).
101. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, CHINA'S ARMS SALES TO ZIMBABWE: FACT SHEET,
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080428-CAH-china-zimbab-armsfs.pdf.
102. See Phillip v. Nat'l Convention Arms Control Comm., no. 4975/08 (High Ct. of
S. Afr., Durban & Coast Local Div. Apr. 18, 2008); U.N. Integrated Reg'1 Info.
Networks, Ship of Shame Adrifi in Controversy,Apr. 22, 2008:
The ship was denied entrance to Durban by the collective efforts of a news
magazine editor, Martin Welz, who warned of the ship's impending arrival,
industrial action by members of the South African Transport and Allied
Workers Union, who said they would not unload the cargo, and the Southern
African Litigation Centre, which obtained a High Court order on 18 April,
prohibiting passage of the weapons across South African soil.
See also George Conger, New Archbishop Calls for Arms Embargo on Zimbabwe, THE
CHURCH
OF
ENGLAND
NEWSPAPER,
Apr.
30,
2008,
available at
http://geoconger.wordpress.com/2008/04/30/new-archbishop-calls-for-arms-embargo-onzimbabwe-cen-43008/.
103. See Beresford, supra note 99.
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and the seller is the Chinese sovereign government, South Africa has
nothing to do with that."l 0 4
At the U.N. Security Council in 2008, the South African
government joined Libya, Vietnam, Russia, and China in voting against
the proposed arms embargo on the Zimbabwe regime. 0 5 The South
African vote was justified on the claim that the U.N. Charter forbids
interference in Zimbabwe's internal affairs.106 Never mind that the
current ruling party in South Africa is the African National Congress
(ANC), a violent revolutionary organization, which fought a war against
South Africa's former apartheid government-and which convinced the
U.N. Security Council to impose an arms embargo on the South African
The institutionalized racial
apartheid government in 1977.107
discrimination of apartheid was a serious violation of human rights-and
the mass murders of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe are likewise
enormous violations of human rights. Greater violations, indeed, if one
considers murdering a person to be worse than restricting him because of
his skin color.
Yet the present ANC regime in South Africa angles for leadership
of Africa (a continent where dictatorships outnumber legitimate
governments), and thus for a permanent seat on the Security Council, by
pandering to anti-Western rhetoric.' 0 So supposedly, the ANC's war
against the Afrikaners (descendants of Dutch settlers who had arrived in
Africa before the Pilgrims landed on Plymouth Rock) was an authentic
effort of African liberation from non-African power. And, supposedly,
any effort to interfere with Robert Mugabe's mass murder of black
Africans is just a form of Western imperialism.
International issues aside, South Africa's own Arms Control Act
should have precluded approval of the transfer through South Africa.' 0 9
As one newspaper pointed out: "The act clearly instructs SA to 'avoid
transfers of conventional arms to governments that systematically violate
104. Zimbabwe Arms Ship Quits S Africa, BBC NEWS, Apr. 19, 2008; see also
Beresford, supra note 99 (Themba Maseko, South African head of government
information, stated, "We are not in a position to act unilaterally and interfere in a trade
deal between two countries.").
105. Benny Avni, Pretoria's Cynicism At the U.N., N.Y. SUN, Feb. 20, 2007,
available at http://www.nysun.com/article/48919; Colum Lynch, South Africa's U.N.
Votes DisappointSome, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2007, availableat http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/15/AR2007041500996.html.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Marian Tupy, Shame the Beloved Country, N.Y. SUN, July 18, 2008.
109. Nat'l Conventional Arms Control Act 41 of 2002 § 15, "When considering
applications contemplated in section 14 the [arms export permitting] Committee must ...
(d) avoid transfers of conventional arms to governments that systematically violate or
suppress human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . .").

2010]

THE ARMS TRADE TREATY

917

or suppress human rights ... ."'110 So South Africa already had a legal

obligation, under its domestic law, to block the transfer, and yet it
approved the transfer.
South Africa is a democratic nation with a functioning judiciary and
a free press. If even democracies will violate their own arms embargoes
for reasons of realpolitik, it is unrealistic to think that dictatorships are
going to be constrained by international treaty obligations. South
Africa's behavior underscores the fact that even when there are strong,
binding legal obligations, arms transfer prohibitions can still be ignored.
The Zimbabwean charged that the government of South Africa "is guilty,
at best, of a weak-kneed stance on Zimbabwe, and at worst, actively
supporting Mugabe and his thugs' diabolical behaviour.""'
At the United Nations, no national delegation outdoes South
Africa's in self-righteous pronouncements about the need for tough
international anti-gun treaties. Never mind that the ATT would have
made it illegal for the revolutionary ANC to acquire arms. And never
mind that the ANC government refuses even to obey South African gun
control laws written by the selfsame ANC government.
B.

The Chinese Government's Arms Supply to Mugabe

China carries on a thriving arms trade with the Mugabe dictatorship.
In 2008, China delivered ammunition to Zimbabwe by having it first
shipped to Sudan, then into the Democratic Republic of Congo (in
flagrant violation of the U.N. arms embargo for the DRC) and from there
to Zimbabwe."12 Chinese troops have been spotted in Zimbabwe,
apparently helping the Mugabe regime protect China's considerable neocolonial investments in mining operations." 3 In an article describing the
Chinese dictatorship as "The Secret Policeman's Saviour," the military
intelligence Web site StrategyPage reported:
China is mainly interested in raw materials, which Zimbabwe has lots
of (especially gold and platinum). China is selling Zimbabwe
communications systems, military trucks and jet fighters, items the
country needs to maintain the current dictatorship. Radio jamming
equipment, to keep out broadcasts criticizing dictator Robert Mugabe,
110. See Editorial, The Ship of Shame, THE ZIMBABWEAN, Apr. 22, 2008, availableat
http://allafrica.com/stories/200804220305.html.
The Zimbabwean is published in the
United Kingdom and offers news by exiled Zimbabwean journalists.
111. See id.
112. Gunrunning To Zimbabwe, STRATEGYPAGE, December 23, 2008, (last visited
Oct. 14, 2009).
113. Asian Mercenaries in Zimbabwe, STRATEGYPAGE, April 24, 2008,
(last
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htparalarticles/20080424.aspx?comments=Y
visited Oct. 14, 2009).
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was also provided by China. Apparently, Chinese advisors have been
working with Zimbabwean secret police and intelligence
114
organizations.
The only Chinese arms transfer that attracted significant
international attention was the "Ship of Shame" in early 2008, which
coincided with the violent repression surrounding another stolen election
in Zimbabwe. The ship, the An Yue Jiang,was loaded with "3.5 million
rounds of ammunition for AK-47 assault rifles and pistols, 1500 RPG
rockets, and 2,500 mortar shells (60mm and 81mm)"" 5 from Poly
Technologies, a Chinese arms manufacturer, which is one of the world's
leading suppliers of AK-47 rifles, and which is run by former Chinese
military officials.1 16
Because of the upcoming Beijing Olympics, the Chinese
government was particularly sensitive to negative international publicity.
Accordingly Jiang Yu, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, stated
that the China Ocean Shipping Company (the merchant marine for the
Chinese military) "decided to recall the ship.""' The U.S. Department of
State passed on that claim to the U.S. Senate. 1 8

114. The
Secret Policeman's Savior, STRATEGYPAGE,
April 3, 2006,
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htpara/articles/20060403.aspx(last visited Oct. 14,
2009); see also Chinese Warplanes Over Africa, STRATEGYPAGE, April 7, 2009,

http://www.strategypage.comIhtmw/htairfo/20090407.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
Russia had also supplied weaponry to the Zimbabwe dictatorship, but stopped doing so
after the bills were not paid.
Procurement, STRATEGYPAGE, June 27, 2001,
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htproc/articles/20010627.aspx (last visited Oct. 14,
2009).
115.

Disarming Zimbabwe, STRATEGYPAGE, April 21, 2008,

http://www.strategy

page.com/htmw/htproc/articles/20080421 .aspx?comments=Y (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
116.

Chinese

Gunrunners

Persist,

STRATEGYPAGE,

April

28,

2008,

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htmurph/articles/20080428.aspx?comments=Y
visited Oct. 14, 2009).
117.

China

Recalls

Weapons

Shipment,

ALLAFRICA.COM,

available

(last
at

http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200804240286.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
118. See Brett D. Schaefer, Zimbabwe: How China kept Mugabe in Power, THE
AFRICAN EXECUTIVE, July 23-28, 2008, available at http://www.africanexecutive.com/

modules/magazine/articles.php?article=3351 &magazine=1 86:
Nonetheless, on June 5, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas
Christensen told the Senate that "it's our understanding that that shipment of
arms sales-that shipment of arms, which is over $1 million, we believe, in
arms-was sent back to China." Although Christensen attributed the recall as a
response to concerns voiced by the international community, the U.S.
government has been unable to verify the Chinese foreign ministry's statement
that the cargo had, in fact, returned to China with the An Yue Jiang.
See also Keren Ben-Zeev, Zimbabwe: Crossing the stretching gulf between a military
regime and a civilian state, HEINRICH BOLL

STIFTUNG,

at n.26, available at

http://www.boell.de/downloads/intlpolitics/2008-08-29_Keren.pdf ("[A]fter offloading
construction materials in Luanda, the An Yue Jiang had to return to China without having
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However, it appears that the Chinese government lied. StrategyPage
had noted that "Poly Technologies has a reputation for getting the goods
delivered, no matter what.""19 Poly Technologies got the job done. After
South African dockworkers refused to unload the An Yue Jiang, reports
surfaced that the ship was headed to Mozambique.1 20 Then the ship
reappeared in Angola, whose dictatorship is closely allied with
Mugabe.121 Because of intense international pressure, the ship did not
initially have authorization to dock in Luanda.122 An anonymous
Angolan government source stated: "The government does not have any
intention to allow that vessel into the country. Given the ongoing
volatile political situation 23in Zimbabwe, we believe we need to approach
this issue very carefully."'1
Unfortunately, the government of Angola made a hasty about-face
and permitted the ship to dock, but said that the only offloading would be
for construction products.' 24 In Luanda, Angola, the ship was observed
closely. The International Transport Workers' Federation reported
"there had been no attempt to offload armaments ..

..

Trade unionists,

including members of the Angolan port workers' union, maintained a
watch on the ship; the police was also present." 2 5 Yet not long

offloaded the arms destined for Zimbabwe."); Chris Buckley, Weapons ship may return
home with cargo, says China, BUSINESS DAY, Nov. 13, 2008.
119. Chinese GunrunnersPersist,supra note 116.
120. See Zimbabwe Arms Ship Quits S Africa, supra note 104.
121. See Tawanda Mashingaidze, Basildon Peta, Hans Pienaar & Louise Flanagann,
'Angolan troops set to help Mugabe', CAPE TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at 1, available at
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?setid=1&clickid=84&artid-vn20080423054525552C
114737 ("Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos has assured Mugabe that battlehardened troops who have seen action in the DRC conflict are ready to fly to the aid of
Zanu-PF. . . ."). The Zimbabwe and Angola regimes signed a cooperation agreement for
military training in 2006 and a defense cooperation agreement in 2002. Friends With
Guns in Zimbabwe, STRATEGYPAGE, October 15, 2006, http://www.strategypage.com/
qnd/pothot/articles/20061015.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
122. See Ports reject Zim arms ship, CAPE ARGUS, Apr. 23, 2008, at 12, available at
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?setid=1 &clickid=68&artid-vn20080423121517658C
47416; see also China may recallZimbabwe weapons, BBC NEWS, Apr. 22, 2008.
123. See Portsreject Zim arms ship, supra note 122.
124. See Angola to allow arms ship to dock, BBC NEWS, Apr. 25, 2008; see also Zim
arms ship arrives, INDEP. ONLINE (South Africa), Apr. 25, 2008, available at
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?setid=l&clickid=68&artid=nw2008042520494665 IC
200742 (last visited Oct. 14, 2009); see also Celia W. Dugger, Angola Allows Chinese
Ship to Dock, but Not Unload Arms for Zimbabwe, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008; Int'l
Transp. Workers' Fed'n, News Online, Chinese Arms Vessel Leaves Angola, May 9,
2008, available at http://www.itfglobal.org/news-online/index.cfm/newsdetail/1943/
region/1/section/0/order/1 (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
125.

See Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n, supra note 124.
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afterward, Zimbabwe's Deputy Information Minister Bright Matonga
declared that the arms shipment reached its intended target. 12 6
Happyton Bonyongwe (the director general of Zimbabwe's Central
Intelligence Organisation),12 7 Zimbabwean Cabinet minister Emmerson
Mnangagwa (a long-serving Mugabe official who is currently Minister of
Defense), and other high-level military authorities traveled to meet
Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santosl 28 , in order to "organise a
way to get the shipment through to Zimbabwe."1 2 9 It was reported that
government agents from Malawi also went to Angola for the same
purpose, and that President Eduardo dos Santos' personal jet was sighted
in Zimbabwe.' 30
The ship apparently turned off its transponder,131 making it difficult
to locate. The six cranes on board the An Yue Jiang may have
transferred the arms containers of munitions to another unknown vessel,
which then delivered the cargo in an unknown manner.13 2 There were
also reports that the An Yue Jiangdocked in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 133
The An Yue Jiang was reported to have been refueled by the South
African Navy's ship, SAS Drakensberg.134 According to The Namibian
newspaper, after the ship was refueled, it headed to the port of Pointe
Noire in Congo-Brazzaville.'13
From there, the arms were flown to
Zimbabwe's capital, Harare, "in giant transport aircraft belonging to
Avient Aviation, a UK-registered freight charter airline operating out of

Zimbabwe."'

36

126. See Lance Guma, Minister Claims ControversialChinese Arms Now in Country,
SW RADIO AFRICA (London), May 6, 2008, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/
printable/200805061078.html ("Deputy Information Minister Bright Matonga on Sunday
claimed that the controversial shipment of arms from China, initially blocked by South
Africa, Mozambique and Zambia, was now in Zimbabwe.").
127. See NationMaster.com, Encyclopedia: Happyton Bonyongwe, http://www.nation
master.com/encyclopedia/Happyton-Bonyongwe (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
128. See Mandy Rossouw, Nic Dawes & Jason Moyo, Did the weapons go through
Angola?,

MAIL

&

GUARDIAN

ONLINE

(UK),

May

1,

2008,

available at

http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-05-01-did-the-weapons-go-through-angola;
see also
Arms from China's 'ship of shame' reach Mugabe, SUNDAY HERALD (Scotland),
available at http://www.sundayherald.com/intemational/shinternational/display.var.
2278991.0.0.php.
129. Chinese arms delivered in Zimbabwe? ACTION AFRICA, May 14, 2008.
130. See Guma, supra note 126.
131. See Zim arms ship reaches Angola, SUNDAY TRIBUNE (South Africa), Apr. 27,
2008, at 15.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See Arms from China's 'ship ofshame' reach Mugabe, supra note 128.
135. See Christof Maletsky, 'Ship of Shame' Cargo Delivered to Country, THE
NAMIBIAN, May 20, 2008.

136.

See id.
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IANSA (a global consortium of gun prohibition organizations)
points to the Ship of Shame as showing the need for an ATT:
The case of the Chinese ship carrying arms destined for Zimbabwe is
a classic case of why the world needs a tough Arms Trade Treaty
....
The shipment risked fuelling serious human rights abuses,
conflict, poverty and corruption in Zimbabwe .... [T]he lack of a

global legally-binding agreement on arms transfers meant the
international community had no legal framework to stop the
shipment. 37
IANSA writes, "If a tough legally binding Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
based on all relevant international law, including human rights law, had
been agreed by all UN Member States then this would have created
stronger obligations on the exporter and transiting states .... 95138
We agree. But the mere creation of a "strong" obligation hardly
means that governments will comply with that obligation. In order to
facilitate Mugabe's acquisition of weapons, the South African
government, run by the African National Congress party, ignored South
African law, which had been created by the very same ANC government.
The Chinese government has used the DR Congo for transshipment of
arms to Zimbabwe, in flagrant violation of the U.N. Security Council
embargo on DRC arms-an embargo that was enacted with the consent
of that same Chinese government.
There is no reason to believe that the Chinese or South African
governments will pay any more attention to new legal obligations than
they do to the existing legal obligations that they are already violating.
C. Brazilian Arms to Zimbabwe
China is not Mugabe's only source for arms. The Small Arms
Survey reports that Zimbabwe is one of the five major recipients of arms

Congo-Brazzaville, also called "Congo," or formally, "Republic of the Congo," is a
distinct nation from the much larger Democratic Republic of the Congo. Congo borders
the western DRC. The Namibian article, which is written in English, calls the Congo port
"Ponta Negra." Id. This appears to be a mistake. The meaning is the same as "Pointe
Noire" ("black point), but since French is an official language of Congo, "Pointe Noire"
is the proper name. "Ponta Negra" is Portuguese, which is a common second language in
much of southwest Africa.
137. Int'l Action Network on Small Arms, China /Zimbabwe case shows the needfor
an ATT, http://www.iansa.org/regions/safrica/ZimShipmentATT.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2009).
138. Int'l Action Network on Small Arms, China/Zimbabwe case shows the needfor
an A TT: How a tough ATT would have helped, http://www.iansa.org/campaigns
events/china zim attO8.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
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exported from Brazil. 139 Notably, Brazil's President Lula fought hard for
an October 2005 referendum to ban firearms from the law-abiding
citizens of Brazil, but he lost 64% to 36%.140 Lula is one of the loudest
voices on the international scene, demanding severe international gun
laws, having previously called for an international tax on the legal sale of
firearms. 14 1 Yet he has refused to use his existing legal powers to block
arms exports to one of the most notorious tyrannies on the planet. His
actions reinforce the suspicion that for many politicians, gun control is a
reflection more of political posturing than of any serious interest in
disarming tyrants.
D.

Zimbabwe's Arms Smuggler is Zimbabwe's Arms Control Delegate

Consider the following speech from a delegate at the U.N.'s 2006
gun control conference:
May you allow me to share with you some of our water tight
measures in the control of any movement of small arms and light
weapons ....
If any individual has to acquire a small arm, be it for self protection
or sports, the process is very strict that only a determined individual
would ever go through the thorough vetting system .... Our control
system has proven that no arms can be trafficked into the country
without an official permit. [Our country] has banned the sale and
possession of self-loading rifles and [sic, to] induviduals [sic] and
security campanies [sic].
Mr President allow me to conclude by saying [our country] has
ratified the SADC [South African Development Community]
protocol on firearms, ammunitions and other related materials. In

139. GRADUATE INST. OF INT'L STUDIES, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2006: UNFINISHED
BUSINESS 69 tbl. 3.1 (2006) [hereinafter SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2006) (reporting data for

2003).
140. Brazilians Reject Gun Sales Ban, BBC NEWS, Oct. 24, 2005.
141. Global tax on guns? Brazil, Francepropose internationallevy on arms sales to
eliminate world hunger, WORLDNETDAILY,
June 3, 2003, available at
http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=32887 (last visited Oct. 21, 2009):
In a speech at the annual meeting of the "Group of Eight," or G8, Brazil's
President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva pushed the arms-sales tax as a scheme
whereby the world's wealthiest nations could fund efforts to eliminate world
hunger, reports Bloomberg News. . . . Calling the Brazilian leader's proposal
"forceful and convincing," Chirac was reluctant to back a levy on weapons
manufacturers in France and elsewhere, but suggested a global tax on firearms
purchases made by individuals, said the report.
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line with the SADC protocol an implementation national action plan
2006-2009 is now in-place. 142
The speech was delivered by Colonel Tshinga J. Dube, the Chief
Delegate of Zimbabwe on Arms Control. 143
Colonel Dube was certainly an expert in the arms trade. The
previous decade, acting on behalf of the government-owned Zimbabwe
Defence Industries (ZDI), he had defrauded the government of Sri Lanka
in a transaction involving 32,400 rounds of mortars that ZDI sold to the
Sri Lankan government but never delivered.14 4 Dube was also involved
in complex international plots in 1999 for the smuggling of arms (in
violation of a U.N. embargo) from Ukraine to Liberia, and to the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone.14 5
Dube also appears to have participated in a scheme to sell AK-47
rifles to mercenaries who were planning a coup to overthrow the
government of Equatorial Guinea; the South African newspaper Beeld
reported that he was "enraged" when the mercenaries and their plane
were seized at Harare Airport. 146
Colonel Dube also happened to be part of a 2004 meeting between
Zimbabwe's Mugabe and China's Norinco (an arms manufacturer
closely tied to the Chinese army), deepening China's role as the largest
foreign investor in Zimbabwe.14 7 In July 2008, Dube was placed on a
European list forbidding his travel within the E.U. because he was
"complicit in forming or directing repressive state policy." 4 8
142. Col. Tshinga J. Dube, Chief Delegate of Zimbabwe on Arms Control,
Presentation by Zimbabwe to The Conference Review Progress Made in the
Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (June 26-July 7, 2006),
availableat http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/arms060628zimeng.pdf.
143. Id.
144.

Duped by Zimbabwe, THE SUNDAY TIMES (Sri Lanka), Sept. 6, 1998, available at

http://www.sundaytimes.lk/980906/spec.htm; Raymond Bonner, Rebels in Sri Lanka
Fight With Aid of GlobalMarket in Light Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1998.
145. Brian Wood, The Prevention of Illicit Brokering of Small Arms and Light
Weapons: Framing The Issue, in U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, DEVELOPING
A MECHANISM TO PREVENT ILLICIT BROKERING IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS-

SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS 1, 4-5 (2007), available at http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/

pdf-art2590.pdf.
146. David Pallister, Murky tale of a mercenary adventure: Speculation grows as
Equatorial Guinea claims plot to kill president was foiled, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 13,
2004; Erika Gibson, Op pad na 'n staatsgreep: SA huursoldate se bestemming was glo
land in Wes-Afrika, BEELD (S. Afr.), Mar. 10, 2004, at 1, availableat http://152.111.1.88/
argief/berigte/beeld/2004/03/1 0/B 1/01 /02.html; Mduduzi Mathuthu, South Africa,
Zimbabwe trained 'mercenaries,' NEW ZIMBABWE, Mar. 9, 2004, available at
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/marl0_2004.html#link2.
147. AMNESTY INT'L, CINA, supra note 80, at 7 (citing Chinese Delegation Seeks
Areas of Co-operation,AFRICA NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 2, 2004).

148.

Commission Regulation 77/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 23) 5, 9 (EC).
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It is quite revealing that the Zimbabwe government sent an
international arms smuggler as its chief delegate to the U.N. conference
on the illicit arms trade.
No one at the U.N. conference was so impolite as to mention that
Zimbabwe's arms control delegate was a notorious international arms
smuggler. So even at a U.N. conference arranged for the precise purpose
of controlling international arms smuggling, and which was run as a
publicity festival for gun prohibition organizations, no one in the room
was willing to utter a word about the brazen absurdity of Zimbabwe
sending an international arms smuggler to tout Zimbabwe's purported
commitment to arms control.
If the NGOs and their member state allies are so reticent in a forum
that they built and ran, it seems hard to believe that they will be any more
courageous in using an ATT forum to do anything serious about
Zimbabwe-particularly since, as at any U.N. forum these days, China
will exercise a de facto veto power, even if it does not have a formal
veto.
III. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Rich in resources, the region now known as the Democratic
Republic of the Congo has long been one of the most miserable places on
earth. For centuries it was a favorite target of Arab slave traders.
Belgium colonized the area in the 1880s, and the colonial rule was
among the most brutal and exploitive of any colonial regime run by a
western government.14 9 Unlike, for example, the French or British
Empires, the Belgians did virtually nothing to promote education, build
useful infrastructure for the people, or provide the rule of law.
Post-independence has been even worse.s 0 Because of the wars in
the eastern DRC, more than 1.3 million people have been driven from
their homes.' 5 1 It is estimated that between two million and five million
people have died as a result of the wars.
A.

The 2003 and 2005 Security Council Embargoes

Using strong language, the U.N. Security Council on July 28, 2003,
established an arms embargo on the DRC's northeastern provinces of

149. See MICHAEL T. KLARE, RESOURCE WARS: THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL
209 (2001).
150. Id.
151. Out Of Control, STRATEGYPAGE, June 11, 2009, http://www.strategypage.com/
qnd/congo/articles/20090611 .aspx (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
CONFLICT
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North Kivu, South Kivu, and the Ituri region of Province Oriental.15 2
The embargo also applied to groups anywhere in the DRC that had not
joined the new peace agreement.15 3
The Security Council sternly condemned the continuing violations
of human rights and humanitarian law, including "violence against
women and girls as a tool of warfare."' 5 4 The Security Council also
expressed profound concern about the continuing theft of the DR
Congo's natural resources.155
With the DR Congo's weak central government unable to control
the ongoing violence,' 56 the Security Council requested that neighboring
states join the reconciliation effort to achieve peace.1
But it soon became evident that the Security Council's wish list for
government control of firearms, peace, and prosperity would not occur.
A January 2005 report from the U.N. group of experts on the DR Congo
explained that the combination of mineral wealth, immoral business
practices, local militia leaders, and deliberate outside interference raised
to a level termed as "psychological warfare,"' 5 8 totally overwhelmed any

152. S.C. Res. 1493, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (July 28, 2003). South Kivu is bordered
by Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda; North Kivu by Rwanda and Uganda; and the Ituri
region by Uganda and Sudan.
153. Id. The European Union also placed an arms embargo on the DR Congo on Apr.
7, 1993. See Stockholm Int'l Peace Research Inst., The European Union Arms embargo
on the DemocraticRepublic of Congo (formerly Zaire).
154. S.C. Res. 1493, supra note 152,19.
155. S.C. Res. 1493, supra note 152, 28.
156. The violence persists. See Lydia Polgreen, Massacre unfurls in Congo, despite
nearby support, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008 ("The executions in Kiwanja are a study in
the unfettered cruelty meted out by the armed groups fighting for power and resources in
eastern Congo. But the events are also a textbook example of the continuing failure of
the world's largest international peacekeeping force, which has a mandate to protect the
Congolese people from brutality.").
157. S.C. Res. 1493, supra note 152, 24.
158. Abdallah Baali, Chairman of U.N. Sec. Council Comm., Letter dated 25 January
2005 from the Chairman of the Sec. Council Comm. Establishedpursuant to res. 1533
(2004) concerningthe Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of
the Sec. Council, 210, U.N. Doc. S/2005/30 (Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Sec. Council
Report):
The front-line States, as well as South Africa, play a critical role in regional
stability and in the success of the arms embargo. Throughout its investigations,
the Group gathered credible information indicating that Rwanda and Uganda
had provided State-authorized arms transfers to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and that their troops had been directly involved in supporting dissident
forces. The Group also has information on companies based in South Africa
that may have violated the arms embargo ....
Throughout its investigations, the Group gathered credible information
indicating that Rwanda and Uganda had provided State-authorized arms
transfers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and that their troops had
been directly involved in supporting dissident forces.
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possibility of a peaceful outcome.159 The report acknowledged that
"forcible disarmament" methods (that is, confiscating guns by armed
force) were unfeasible at this point. 16 0
In 2005, the Security Council reported that government officials
from Rwanda and Uganda were providing state-authorized arms
shipments into embargoed areas and that South African companies were
also supplying weapons.16 1 Amnesty International found that firearms
were flooding into the DR Congo from many other countries. 162 Africa
Confidential wrote, "Links to armed groups are so tight that Ituri's rebel
leaders travel to Kampala to meet government officials."1 63 The black
market, fueled by loot obtained from the DR Congo's natural resources,
was totally in control.
Indeed, U.N. investigators found that power brokers within the
national government of the DRC itself appear to have supplied arms to
the FDLR (Forces dmocratiques de liberation du Rwanda), which is
run by former members of the Interahamwe-the perpetrators of the
Rwandan genocide. They fled to the DRC after being ousted from power
and now operate in the DRC. 164 When, in October 2003, a Moldovan
cargo plane crash landed in Kamina in the Katanga province of the DRC,
the DRC army forcibly prevented U.N. staff from investigating; the plane
was allegedly filled with arms intended for groups in South Kivu. 165
Likewise, in 2004 the U.N. was repeatedly obstructed from inspecting air
cargos connected to the government-allied MLC (Mouvement de
Libiration du Congo) and its military arm, the ALC (Arme pour la
Libdrationdu Congo).166
So on April 18, 2005, the Security Council expanded the embargo
to the entire DRC, with certain exceptions. Among the mandatory new
requirements of the embargo was that all governments in the region,
including the DRC itself and the nations bordering Ituri or the Kivus,
maintain a registry of all airplane flights to or from the DRC and that the
registry be available to U.N. inspectors.16 7

159. See id.
160. Id. at 208. For forcible disarmament in Kenya and Uganda, see David B.
Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, Human Rights and Gun Confiscation, 26
QUINNIPIAC L.REv. 385 (2008).

161.
162.

See Sec. Council Report, supra note 158.
See Arms still flowing into DR Congo, BBC NEWS, July 5, 2005.

163.
164.

See OperationKisanja, 46 AFR. CONFIDENTIAL 4, 5 (2005).
AMNESTY INT'L, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: ARMING THE EAST 59

(July 2005) [hereinafter ARMING THE EAST].
165. Id. at 61-62. Cf Sec. Council Report, supra note 158, at IT 160-61 (pattem of
human rights abuses by the army).
166. Id. at 62.
167. Id. at 21.
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Air transportation is particularly important to DRC arms smuggling
because the DRC does not have a functional national road network. A
previous dictator, Mobuto Sese Seko, followed the same policy as had
the Russian Czars: to reduce the ability of the peoples of a large and
diverse nation to mobilize against the dictatorship, and to avoid
development of efficient means of intra-national travel and
communications. Accordingly, the transportation of arms (like the
transportation of many other valuable products) to or from the DRC
takes place primarily by airplane. The fact that overland smuggling of
arms to the DRC is much more difficult than overland smuggling to most
other non-island nations would be expected to make enforcement of the
arms embargo easier.
Amnesty International explained that
"[e]xperience from the UN embargoes on Sierra Leone and Liberia
shows that without grounding and controlling such [smuggling] aircraft,
there can be little done to prevent arms flows."l 68
B.

Embargo Violations by Albania, Burundi, China, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, and
Zimbabwe

Amnesty International notes: "Since 2003, no state has reported to
the UN an authorized export of arms to the DRC, yet there is no shortage
of arms and ammunition arriving in the DRC."l 69
China has been a major supplier of arms to various armed groups of
human rights violators in Kivu and Ituri, via direct shipments to the
DRC, as well as via Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. 1 0 Some of the
Chinese arms in the DRC were first supplied to Zimbabwe or Albania,
and then forwarded into the DRC.171 In Uganda, the Luweero Industries
arms factory was built with assistance from China and is a subsidiary of
the state-owned National Enterprises Corporation.172 Arms from the
factory have been shipped into the eastern DRC. 173
The Small Arms Survey reported that the borders between the DRC
and Sudan and Uganda "are porous and allow unchecked small arms

proliferation."1

74

The Ugandan government army (the UPDF, Ugandan People's
Defence Forces) has made incursions into the DRC and worked in Ituri
with the FNI (Frontdes nationalistesintigrationnistes)to support a gold
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 68.
Id. at 38.

174.

SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2006, supra note 139, at 282 box 11.3.

supra note 80, at 8.
ARMING THE EAST, supra note 164.
Id. at 46.
Id.
AMNESTY INT'L, CHINA,
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smuggling operation, in which gold is smuggled out of the DRC via
Uganda, and the FNI uses its share of the revenues to procure arms. 175
The Ugandan army's actions were a "flagrant violation" of the U.N.
embargo, according to MONUC.' 7 6
With the approval of the South African government, arms have been
shipped to Rwanda (in violation of another U.N. arms embargo), and
from there have been delivered to RCD-Goma, a militant faction in the
DRC, which has been supported and supplied by the Rwandan
government.17 7 The Rwandan government authorized arms shipments
into the DRC for the purpose of supplying RCD-Goma, in flagrant
violation of the U.N. embargo. 17 8
Another militant group responsible for extensive abuses of human
rights, the UPC (Union des patriotes congolais), obtained arms from
South Africa and the Balkans-according to a confidential U.N. report,
which was supposed to be seen only by the Security Council, but which
was leaked to the public.1 79
The DRC army itself continues to sell weapons to the FDLR
(Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda, founded by the
Rwandan genocidaires operating in the DRC), as they work together to
exploit gold and tin mines. 8 0 In November 2009, the New York Times
obtained a secret United Nations report which confirmed that the
Congolese army itself is massively involved in the smuggling of
weapons to warlords in the eastern Congo. According to the Times'
summary of the report, there is "a vast, rebel-driven criminal network in
eastern Congo with tentacles touching Spanish charities, Ukrainian arms
dealers, corrupt African officials and even secretive North Korean
weapons shipments ....

The report charges that government officials in

several African countries are working hand in hand with the rebels to

175. ARMING THE EAST, supra note 164, at 63-65.
176. Id. MONUC is an acronym is for Mission de l'Organisationdes Nations Unies
en Republique democratique du Congo (Mission of the United Nations Organization in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
177. Id. at 24. The RCD-Goma's military branch is the ANC, Armie nationale
congolaise.
178. Id. at 51.
179. Id. at 24.
180. See DR Congo army 'works with rebels,'BBC NEWS, Sept. 10, 2008.
Human Rights Watch recommended to the government of the DR Congo "Halt
immediately the promotion of armed group leaders to senior ranks in the Congolese
army. Investigate and bring to justice those promoted to generals and other senior ranks
....
Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of Congo 5
(2005),
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drcG5050.pdf
[hereinafter Curse of Gold].
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help smuggle out minerals and bring in guns."' 8 ' What has the U.N.
Security Council done about the massive violations of its embargoes?
Nothing. As the Institute for Security Studies summarizes, "[T]he
Security Council has been loath to take punitive action against those
member states that have been consistently implicated in embargo-busting
activities in reports by panels of experts."' 82
C.

The U.N.'s Participationin Arms Smuggling in Violation of the
U.N. Embargo

BBC reporter Martin Plaut broke the story that "Pakistani UN
peacekeeping troops have traded in gold and sold weapons to Congolese
militia groups they were meant to disarm. . .. " According to Plaut, a
confidential internal U.N. report found evidence of a smuggling network
involving Pakistani MONUC peacekeepers.184
The U.N. purported to investigate, and Jean-Marie Gu6henno, U.N.
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, announced, "The
investigation has found no evidence of gun smuggling. But it has
identified an individual who seemed to have facilitated gold
smuggling."' 85 Alan Doss, head of MONUC, insisted that the arms
smuggling allegations could not be proven.' 8 6 Likewise, the previous
head of MONUC, William Lacy Swing,' 87 rejected the arms smuggling
allegations: "This I can categorically deny." 88
Plaut refuted the whitewash:
181.

Jeffrey Gettleman, Congo Army Helps Rebels Get Arms, U.N. Finds, N.Y.

TIMES, Nov. 25, 2009.

182. Guy Lamb, Beyond 'Shadow-Boxing' and 'Lip Service' The Enforcement of
Arms Embargoes in Africa, at "Actions by the UN Security Council" (The Institute for
Security Studies, Occasional Paper 135, 2007), available at http://www.iss.co.za/static/
templates/tmpl-html.php?nodeid=2175&slinkjid=4354&slink-type=12&link id=19
("[T]he Security Council has found difficulty in enhancing the capacity of its Secretariat
responsible for dealing with sanctions."); see also DAMIEN FRUCHART ET AL., UNITED
NATIONS ARMS EMBARGOES: THEIR IMPACT ON ARMS FLOWS AND TARGET BEHAVIOUR 55

(2007), availableat http:/Ibooks.sipri.org/files/misc/UNAE/SIPRIO7UTNAE.pdf ("Despite
a significant body of evidence implicating such actors in UN arms embargo violations,
little action has been undertaken at the global level to encourage or coerce actors to
comply with their international obligations in these cases.").
183. See Martin Plaut, UN troops 'tradedgoldfor guns', BBC NEWS, May 23, 2007.
184. See Martin Plaut, UN troops 'helpedsmuggle gold', BBC NEWS, Aug. 11, 2007.
185. Martin Plaut, UN Troops 'armed DR Congo rebels', BBC One Panorama, Apr.
28, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/panorama/7331077.stm
(last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
186. See id. (Doss' comments are contained in the video clip accompanying the
online BBC story.)
187. See Interview by IRIN News with MONUC chief William Swing (Aug. 14, 2003),
available at http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?Reportld-45492 (last visited Oct. 16,
2009).
188. Plaut, UN Troops 'tradedgoldfor guns, 'supra note 183.
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There are indications that the UN covered up what was taking place
for political reasons . . . . UN insiders the BBC has spoken to tell us

this aspect [gun smuggling] of the UN report was suppressed for
political reasons-it was simply too difficult to accuse Pakistan of rearming known killers, since Pakistan is the largest troop contributor
to the UN, providing 10,000 troops across the world. 189
We know that ammunition made in Pakistan was confiscated from
rebel groups by MONUC.1 90 From a question to the spokesperson for the
Secretary General of the U.N., we know that there was at least $2.5
million in gold that was part of the smuggling operation.191 We also
know that Ugandan Defence Minister Crispus Kiyonga charged that
MONUC had re-armed rebels. 19 2
Human Rights Watch chided the U.N.'s Jean-Marie Gu~henno,
stating:
We are, however, disappointed by the apparent narrowness of the
report's conclusions, the lack of transparency in the process, the slow
progress of the investigation, and most important, the continuing lack
of accountability. You told the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) on July 13 that this matter is "now closed." Yet no individual
has yet been held accountable despite findings by 010S, the
investigative arm of the United Nations, that illegal behavior by at
least one Pakistani officer had occurred.193

189. Plaut, UN Troops 'armedDR Congo rebels',supra note 185.
190. See Alex Vines, Instruments of the UN Security Council to Address Conflict
Resources, 5 Human Sec. Bulletin 18 (2007), available at http://www.humansecurity.
info/#/vol52-vines/4527474079 ("It is interesting to note that some date-stamps of bullets

from ammunition confiscated from rebel groups by MONUC are by the Pakistan
Ordnance Factory.").
191. See U.N. Spokesperson's Noon Briefing, Dep't of Pub. Info.Daily Press Briefing
by the Offices of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General & the Spokesperson for the
General Assembly President (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/News/
briefings/docs/2007/db070523.doc.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) (question noting the
$2.5 million figure).
Putting this in perspective, Human Rights Watch noted that between $240,000 to
$720,000 in gold per month (at the time the report was written) was taken from the
Mongbwalu area. See Curse of Gold, supra note 180.
192. See MONUC, Uganda accuses UN peacekeepers of arming DR Congo rebels,
Apr. 30, 2008; see also Clarification Regarding the MONUC (the United Nations

Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) Scandal Involving Gold and Arms
Trafficking in Mongbwalu, Ituri District, Oriental Province, DRC, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/sharedfbsp/hi/pdfs/24_04_08_rebelletter.pdf (last visited Oct.
16, 2009) ("The MONUC Pakistani Blue Helmets were engaged in the sale of various
items (computers, freezers, mobile phones, food stuffs, . . .) for which we were used as
intermediaries between them and buyers and, at times, we were buyers ourselves.").
193. Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, & Steve Crawshaw, UN
Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch, to Jean-Marie Gu6henno, Under-Secretary-

2010]

THE ARMS TRADE TREATY

931

HRW expressed incredulity that supposedly only one peacekeeper was
involved and stated: "It is our view that the assistance provided by
Pakistani peacekeepers went well beyond one individual."l 9 4 HRW was
concerned that "[t]he slow process in carrying out this investigation and
the continued lack of action raises important questions about how the UN
investigates itself." 9 5
That the U.N. would be involved in arms smuggling in the DRC
should not be shocking. Other U.N. "peacekeepers" and staff in the
DRC had a lengthy involvement in sexual abuse of women and children,
a problem which was covered up by the U.N. itself, despite thenSecretary General Kofi Annan's self-serving protestations to the
contrary.96

According to the gun prohibition NGOs, a government official's
failure to exercise "due diligence" against the transfer of arms to human
rights violators means that the official is criminally liable before the
International Criminal Court (ICC) for the crimes committed with those
arms, under the principles of liability for aiding or abetting. 19 7
General for Peacekeeping Operations (July 23, 2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/
legacy/english/docs/2007/07/23/congol6448_txt.htm.
194. See id.
195. See id. HRW also expressed concern, in this same document, about how the
U.N. handled other allegations about its peacekeepers' behavior:
We note in this connection that the allegations against the Pakistanis are just
one of a series of allegations that have emerged in recent months. These
include allegations of gold trading by Indian peacekeepers in North Kivu, the
alleged killing of two Congolese detainees and the beating of others by
Bangladeshi peacekeepers in Ituri in February 2005, and ongoing allegations of
sexual exploitation, among others. As far as we are aware, nobody has been
prosecuted in connection with most of these cases.
See also Nile Gardiner, The U.N. Peacekeeping Scandal in the Congo: How Congress
Should Respond (Mar. 1, 2005), in Heritage Lectures, Mar. 22, 2005, available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/lnternationalOrganizations/upload/76028-I.pdf.
196. See Annan vows to end sex abuse committed by UN mission staff in DR of
Congo, UN NEWS CENTRE, Nov. 19, 2004, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID= 12590&Cr-democratic&Crl=congo; The Secretary-General, Report
of the Secretary-Generalon the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services,
Financingof the United Nations OrganizationMission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, 35, U.N. Doc. A/59/661 (Jan. 5, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/gal
search/viewdoc.asp?symbol=A%2F59%2F661&Submit-Search&Lang-E
("Although
MONJC has prepared directives on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, at
present, little has been done to implement an effective prevention programme in Bunia.");
id. at 1 38 ("On several occasions, the commanders of these contingents [in Bunia, DR
Congo] either failed to provide the requested information or assistance or actively
interfered with the investigation.").
197. Under international human rights law, States are responsible for their own
actions and the actions of their agents. They also have a duty to prevent
patterns of abuse committed by private persons, whether or not they are acting
under the control of the State. Failure to exercise "due diligence" by omitting
to take the necessary steps to protect individuals from organised crime such as
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By this standard, the ICC should open an investigation of the United
Nations officials, including Kofi Annan, who appear to have been active
participants in efforts to cover up MONUC's illegal arms sales in the
Congo.
Further, according to a recent report from Human Rights Watch,
"MONUC's support of the Congolese armed forces, particularly after
receiving credible reports of gross violations of human rights, raises
serious concern that MONUC itself is implicated in these grave
abuses."' 9 8 The report provides extensive evidence that MONUC
involvement strengthened Congolese army units which perpetrated mass
rapes and mass murders of civilians. 99 Another blatant failure of due
diligence by the U.N. helped provide a cornucopia of arms to DRC
warlords. Since 1998, the U.N. has been leading an international
campaign to disarm the people of Albania.200 When the collapse of a
pyramid scheme led to the collapse of government for a period in 1997,
over a million guns were looted from government storehouses. 20 1 Since
then, the U.N. has been working assiduously to collect them, although
many Albanian families are reluctant to surrender their only means of
protection, especially as the government is manifestly unable to provide
protection, particularly in rural areas.202 However, about two hundred
thousand guns have been collected.203 As it turns out, the Albanian
government, after rounding up the guns at the U.N.'s behest, then sold a

kidnapping and killing for ransom can amount to a violation of human rights
law. In some cases, the obligation to protect individuals from violations
perpetrated by private actors is part and parcel of the State's obligation not to
commit the violation itself For example, failing to adopt the necessary
measures to prevent acts of torture from being carried out on one's territory
may amount to more than a violation of the "due diligence" standard and be
treated as a breach of the international norm prohibiting torture.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in Article 25
(3)(c), establishes criminal responsibility if a person aids, abets or otherwise
assists in the commission or the attempted commission of a crime, including by
providing the means for its commission. Providing the weapons used to
commit or attempt to commit one of the crimes for which the ICC has
jurisdiction is sufficient to give rise to responsibility as an accomplice.
COMPILATION OF GLOBAL PRINCIPLES, supranote 61, at 21.
198. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "YOU WILL BE PUNISHED": ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS IN
EASTERN CONGO 17 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
drcl209webwcover I.pdf.
199. Id. at 134-55.
200. David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, Microdisarmament: The

Consequences for Public Safety and Human Rights, 73 UMKC L. REv. 969 (2005)
[hereinafterMicrodisannament].
201. Timeline: Albania, BBC NEWS, July 9, 2009 (1997: "Up to a million weapons
are looted from army stores as angry mobs take to the streets.").

202. Microdisarmament,supra note 200.
203. Id.
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large number of them to Rwanda, and from there they were shipped to
the Rwandan-allied groups in the DRC.
Theoretically, a violation of an ATT embargo could lead to a
prosecution in the ICC. In this regard, as in regard to almost everything
else, the ATT merely duplicates existing international law, since a
violation of a Security Council arms embargo could also lead to an ICC
prosecution.
Either way, the ICC has shown that it will be of little use. Human
rights organizations were happy when the ICC arrested Thomas
Lubanga, the head of the Congolese Patriotic Union (UPC). 20 4 Lubanga
and his group are believed to have perpetrated many rapes and murders
in northeast Congo.20 5
Yet to call the ICC prosecution of Lubanga inept would be
generous. The first and only chief prosecutor in ICC history is Luis
Moreno Ocampo.206 In a recent issue of World Affairs, Julie Flint and
Alex de Waal described Ocampo's handling of the Lubanga prosecution
in particular, and the prosecutor's office in general, as self-serving,
publicity-driven, lazy, and lacking in the elementary diligence that would
be expected of any prosecutor, let alone the most important international
prosecutor in the world.207 As a result, Lubanga's trial was repeatedly
postponed, and the only formal charges against Lubanga are the alleged
use of child soldiers, rather than the mass murders and systematic
rapes.20 8
D.

After Failing Twice, Do the Same Thing Again

Control Arms argues that the many breaches of the Security Council
embargoes on the DRC prove the need for an ATT. 20 9 Rt. Brigadier
Mujahid Alam, a Pakistani in MONUC, stated at a meeting of Amnesty
International held at the United Nations in 2008:
It is the illicit trade and trafficking of arms which is causing all the

problems in Congo and causing all the casualties in the civilian
population. All of the militias and illegal groups have arms. In the
Democratic Republic of Congo we have a UN arms embargo, but it
has proved totally ineffective. That is why an Arms Trade Treaty has

204.
AFFAIRS,

Julie Flint & Alex de Waal, Case Closed: A Prosecutorwithout Borders, WORLD
Spring 2009, at 23, 30-3 1.

205. Id.
206. Id.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
See DR Congo arms embargo failing', BBC NEWS, Oct. 16, 2006.

934

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114:3

become so important. An arms embargo by itself won't deliver the
goods. An ATT plus embargo would be much more effective.2 10
Like so many ATT advocates, he failed to offer any argument about
why an international law mandate imposed by an ATT would be more
likely to be obeyed than an international law mandate imposed by the
Security Council.
Some of the suppliers of arms to the DRC are plainly impervious to
international law. For example, the Sudanese dictatorship, which has
ratified but flagrantly violated the International Convention on Genocide,
is currently the target of arrest warrants from the ICC. 2 11 Yet the ICC's
actions have led the regime to intensify rather than relent from its crimes
against the people of Darfur. If the regime will flout the ICC, it is
unrealistic to expect that an ATT will convince the regime to stop
profiting from the supply of arms into the DRC.
Other regimes, such as those of Rwanda or Uganda or Albania, have
not achieved Sudan's pariah status, but it is hard to see why they will
shrink from violating two international law obligations, if they are
already willing to violate one such obligation.
Indeed, the theory that two binding obligations will do the trick
where one binding obligation has failed is already disproven by the
events in the DRC. Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, Burundi, and the DRC
itself (all of which have violated the U.N. embargo on the DRC) are all
signatories to the Nairobi Protocol, a U.N.-sponsored gun control treaty
for East African nations.2 12
Putting aside the Security Council
embargoes, the Nairobi Protocol outlaws the DRC arms smuggling in
which the aforesaid nations have been engaged.213
In practice, the Nairobi Protocol's insistence on severe gun control
has proven effective in providing the signatory nations with an additional
pretext to disarm their domestic populations, which has the effect of
rendering them defenseless against human rights abusers. But the
Protocol has been an abject failure in preventing arms smuggling by
these same regimes.

210. See Control Arms, Senior military Officers back an Arms Trade Treaty,
available at http://www.controlarms.org/en/events/first-comm-2008/senior-militaryofficers-back-an-arms-trade-treaty (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
211. Warrant Issuedfor Sudan's Leader, BBC NEWS, Mar 4, 2009.
212. Other signatories are Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania, and
Seychelles.
213. See Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms
and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, Apr. 21, 2004, at
art. 2(a), available at http://www.smallarmsnet.org/docs/saafl2.pdf, ("prevent, combat
and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of, trafficking in, possession and use of small arms
and light weapons in the sub-region.").

THE ARMS TRADE TREATY

2010]

935

Amnesty International's solution is to urge that there be "a joint
monitoring mechanism to ensure the effective compliance . . . with the
Nairobi Protocol . ... ,,214 As if anyone would pay more attention to the

reports of the joint monitoring mechanism than is paid the reports from
MONUC itself, which detail how the Nairobi signatories are smuggling
arms into the DRC.

IV. Two ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
In this Part, we present two ideas about how to address problems
related to the acquisition of arms by human rights violators. We do not
claim that these two proposed solutions are the only possibilities; nor do
we claim that these ideas, by themselves, would solve the whole
problem. We offer them merely as starting points for discussion.
Because ATT embargoes cannot realistically be expected to succeed
where previous embargoes have failed, the tremendous amount of time
and energy being invested in the ATT is a dangerous distraction.
Humanitarian organizations, diplomats, and the rest of the freedomloving international community should more wisely invest their time in
exploring potential alternative solutions.
If you, the reader, decide that our two proffered solutions would be
ineffective or harmful, then we urge you to continue to search for better
ones. The Arms Trade Treaty is not going to help the victims of human
rights abuses, so it is essential to look far and wide for ideas that might
really help.
A.

Cut ForeignAid

Foreign aid ends up paying for up to 40% of arms purchases by
African governments. So found Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, in a
global study covering 1960-99.215
The International Monetary Fund suspended aid to Zimbabwe's
government in the early twenty-first century. Although the suspension
resulted from the government's failure to achieve budget goals,2 16 the
suspension undoubtedly reduced the government's resources for arms
purchases.

214.

ARMING THE EAST, supra note 164, at 72.

215. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote
Arms Races? 69 OXFORD BULL. OF ECON. & STAT. 1 (2007); PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM
BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT

103 (2007).
216. Trends and Markers: Some facts about Zimbabwe, 14 AFR. SEC. REv. 69, 71
(2005).
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The government of Rwanda is heavily dependent on foreign aid and
probably could not have afforded its massive arms purchases without that
aid.217 Amnesty International recommended that when international aid
is donated to the DRC, Rwanda, or Uganda by the United States, Japan,
or European nations, the donors "should ensure that such aid does not
serve the purpose, directly or indirectly via fungible accounting or
resource exchanges, of purchasing or acquiring arms or related military
and security items."218
In Zimbabwe, the opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai has finally
been allowed to participate, nominally, in a coalition government. 2 19 But
the Washington Post argues that the United States should not provide
foreign aid to Zimbabwe:
A power-sharing deal aimed at restoring democracy has mostly
shored up strongman Robert Mugabe.
... Mr. Mugabe's control over the state remains unbroken. He still

commands the army and security forces and has violated or ignored
most of the political provisions in the coalition agreement.
Opposition leaders still face arrest and prosecution on trumped-up
charges, white-owned farms still are being illegally seized and
restrictions on the media have not been lifted. The 85-year-old
president and his coterie of thugs evidently have no intention of
complying with a plan to hold new elections under a revised
constitution two years from now.
Now Mr. Tsvangirai is on a three-week tour of Western capitalsincluding this week in Washington-to campaign for fresh economic
aid that Mr. Mugabe could not dream of obtaining on his own. Mr.
Tsvangirai should not get any ....
Until Mr. Mugabe yields power, nothing should be done that would
serve to prop up the current government-even if it is headed by a
more palatable politician. 220
A government's decision to supply foreign aid is based on a wide
variety of factors, and in this Article, we do not attempt to analyze all the
issues that militate for or against foreign aid to particular nations.
However, if reducing arms acquisitions by warlords and dictators
were considered to be the paramount goal, then terminating "aid" to most

217.

ARMING THE EAST, supra note 164, at 34.

218. Id. at 73.
219. Mugabe, Tsvangirai and Mutambara Sign Power Sharing Deal, NEW
ZIMBABWE.COM, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/mbekil64.
18763.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
220. Editorial, Zimbabwe's 'Transition,' THE WASH. POsT, June 13, 2009, at A14.
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of the African regimes mentioned in this Article would be the logical
result.
B.

Provide the Tools for Self-Defense

It must be emphasized that the warring factions in the DR Congo do
not treat the civilian population as innocent bystanders. The civilians are
not "collateral damage." To the contrary, much of the victimization of
the civilian population is carried out deliberately by the various groups.
For example, the FDLR (founded by the Rwandan Hutu genocidaires)
"live off the locals, looting, raping and killing on a regular basis,
extorting food and other goods via the threat of murder. From time to
time, the Hutu rebels continue to kill dozens of villagers, to maintain the

climate of terror." 22 1
Recalling some militia battles in Ituri, one MONUC officer stated,
"We had the impression that the soldiers were not fighting each other,
but rather the civilian population."222 In May 2004, dissidents from
RCD-Goma took over Bukavu city in South Kivu and commenced what
became known as operation TDF (tilefones, dollars, filles; that is,
"mobile telephones, dollars, daughters"), demanding TDF as they broke
into homes, raped over a hundred females, including seventeen girls, age
13 years or younger (among them a 3 year old), and murdered more than
sixty people.223
The DRC rebel groups which, as part of an amnesty deal, joined
with the DRC military are no better: "[T]he former rebels did not give
up their warlord ways, and continued to abuse civilians (rape, murder,
looting)."22 4 For example, the United Nations reported a 2007 looting
"rampage" by the Congolese National Army, the FARDC (Forces
armies de la rdpublique dmocratique du Congo).2 25 The U.N. has
asked that several of the DRC army warlords be arrested for war crimes,
but the DRC government has refused.2 26
As StrategyPage observed:
The Army is performing not much differently from the warlord
militias they fight, because the army is poorly paid, and led. Often
former warlord fighters, the soldiers have not had much training, and
are often commanded by officers and sergeants who are also former
221.
222.

Out Of Control,supra note 151.
ARMING THE EAST, supra note 164, at 12 (quoting Amnesty International report

of interview with officer regarding militia battles in Ituri).
223.

ARMING THE EAST, supra note 164, at 15.

224.

Out Of Control,supra note 151.

225. War Enters the Bandit Phase, STRATEGYPAGE, March 20, 2007,
https://www.strategypage.com/qnd/congo/20070322.aspx (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
226.

Out Of Control,supra note 151.
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irregulars. Just renaming poorly trained gunmen as "soldiers"
doesn't make it so. And in the field, the "soldiers" behave as they
used to, raping and looting more than fighting the bandits and
warlord gunmen.227
Similarly, the members of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) "live
by looting from local villages."228 The town of Faradje lies in the far
northeastern Congo, near the borders with Sudan and Uganda. Nearby is
Garamba National Park, which has become a hideout for the LRA. The
LRA, which has operated in southern Sudan and northern Uganda for
two decades, is notably vicious even by the standards of Central Africa.
As the New York Times put it: "[K]idnapping children and turning them
into porters, sex slaves and killing machines seems to be their special

form of cruelty." 22 9
The 25,000 villagers of Faradje have been abandoned by the
Congolese National Army and by MONUC. In December 2008, the
Congolese National Army, in conjunction with the Ugandan army and
with the assistance of American advisors, attempted an offensive against
the LRA's base in Garamba National Park.2 30 The offensive failed, and
the LRA went on a rampage against nearby civilians.2 3' In Faradje, more
than 150 people, including the town's only doctor, were killed, and more
than 200 people, mostly young people, were kidnapped.232 The civilian
death toll from recent LRA activity totaled more than one thousand.2 33
So the people of Faradje have formed a self-defense militia.
Thousands of men and teenagers participate in the militia, which patrols
the area; they are armed with axes, machetes, slingshots, and poor quality
shotguns, not ideal for self-defense against the LRA, which has machine
guns and mortars,234 but much better than nothing and much better than
relying on futile hopes for protection by the CNA or MONUC.
For some people, arms policy is not a means to an end, but an end
itself-that is, the fulfillment of the aesthetic goal of a disarmed global
227. The War on Rebel Militias, STRATEGYPAGE,
March
14, 2006,
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/congo/articles/20060314.aspx(last visited Oct. 16,
2009).
228. Out Of Control, supra note 151.
229. Jeffrey Gettleman, Armed with Little but Resolve, And Defending a Hollowed
Village, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 2009, at Al 1. The LRA has been active in the Nord-Kivu
and Orientale provinces of the DRC at least since 2005. In January 2006, the LRA killed
eight Guatemalan peacekeeping troops; LRA activities have forced NGOs which were
removing land mines in the DRC to suspend activities. SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2006,
supra note 139, at 276.
230. Gettleman, supra note 230.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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populace. For other people, arms policy is a means to an end-such as
humanitarian improvement of the conditions of victimized people. If we
treat arms policy as a means rather than an end, then it seems clear that
there are some groups which it would be desirable to disarm-for
example, the army of Zimbabwe. Likewise, there are groups for which
more and better arms would improve the humanitarian situation. The
militia of Faradje is an example.
As this Article has argued, disarming human rights violators, such
as the army of Zimbabwe or the LRA is eminently desirable, but quite
difficult in practice; and the ATT will do little, if anything, to prevent
rights violators from acquiring even more arms. In contrast, providing
defensive arms to victims would be easy. Bringing one plane's worth of
quality firearms and ammunition into Faradje could supply plenty of
defensive arms to the Faradje militia. Given that the CNA and MONUC
are quite evidently not going to protect Faradje, the best humanitarian
choice would be to help the people of Faradje, and the rest of the DRC,
to protect themselves.
An argument against allowing arms possession by civilians is that
the civilians themselves will misuse guns. For example, people in some
rural parts of North Kivu, in the DRC, speak Rwanda. 35 The ANC (the
armed wing of RCD-Goma) has distributed arms to Rwandaphone
civilians there, claiming that the civilians need arms to protect
themselves from attacks by the FDLR (the Rwandans in the DRC who
are allied with, or belonged to, the genocidal former regime in Rwanda
and its "security" force, the Interahamwe.). Further, RCD supporters say
that they fear a possible campaign by the central government of the
DRC, or by the DRC army to exterminate the Rwandaphones in the
eastern DRC, or to drive them out of the country.2 36
But some of the arms that the ANC distributed to civilians were not
used for legitimate defense. In December 2004 in Nyabiondo, ANC
soldiers massacred dozens of Hunde civilians, and there were reports that
armed Rwandaphone civilians participated in the attack.2 37 More
generally, a local police official in North Kivu reported an increase in
robberies and ambushes as a result of the supplying of arms to the
Rwandaphones.23 8
Another source of civilian arms supply in the northeast DRC has
been Ugandan traders using the cover of darkness to bring in small

235. The language is also known as "Kinyarwanda." It is widely spoken not only in
the nation of Rwanda, but also in southern Uganda and in the eastern DRC.
236. ARMING THE EAST, supra note 164, at 53.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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quantities of arms by bicycle or on foot. 239 A study by the Christian
pacifist NGO Pax Christi reported, "Most of the users of such weapons
were said to be armed criminal gangs, rebel soldiers and increasing
numbers of self-defence militia, although some weapons were used just
for hunting. The researchers found that such arms were being used for
wide scale criminality and human rights abuses." 24 0
The findings highlight a problem of the prohibition of arms (and, for
that matter, other items): when there is no legal market, the trade is
conducted in a black market, and the black market sellers will sell to
anyone, whether the buyer is nefarious or benign. In contrast, when
there is a regulated, legal market, the legal vendors have incentives to
comply with laws that distinguish legitimate buyers (e.g., persons buying
guns for self-defense or hunting) from the illegitimate ones (e.g., persons
with a record of perpetrating gang crimes). The regulated system is not
perfect, but it is better than the black market one.
If, somehow, the eastern DRC could return to the days when people
were armed only with bows and spears and when firearms were rare, the
country might be much better off. But the people of North and South
Kivu, and Ituri, live in a world in which they are prey for diverse bands
of warlord armies, including some related to the nominal government.
They are likewise prey to smaller-scale criminals who have taken
advantage of the thriving arms smuggling in which the DRC
government, and every government bordering the eastern DRC, and the
United Nations itself, has been complicit.
A humanitarian arms policy for the eastern DRC should provide
self-defense arms for families and villages, so that they can protect
themselves from the depredations of warlords. The distribution of
legitimate defensive arms could be organized so that arms are not given
to villages or individuals that are known to have perpetrated crimes or
human rights abuses.
Undoubtedly, some guns would still end up in the wrong hands, but
the good people would at least have the ability to protect themselves.
Because all the warlord armies (including those which are part of the
national army) subsist by looting and pillaging, if most of the villages
had the ability to defend themselves, then the warlords would lose their
supply base and might find it much more difficult to attract new recruits
or to maintain their existing forces.
As William Blackstone explained, the right to arms is the human
right that is most necessary in situations like the eastern DRC:
239. Id. at 67.
240. Id. (sunnarizing the findings of Pax Christi (Netherlands), Proliferation and
Illicit Traffic ofSmall Arms and Light Weapons in the Northeastof the DRC, Jan. 2003).
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The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present
mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their
condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law ... and it is

indeed a public allowance under due restrictions, of the natural right
of resistance and self preservation, when the sanctions of society and
laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.241
The regime in Kinshasa cannot control its own army, let alone
employ that army so as to defeat all the warlords (including the warlords
who are nominally part of the Congolese army) and thereby provide
security of the people of the eastern DRC. But one can at least imagine
that the Kinshasa government would like to do so.
The situation in Zimbabwe is considerably worse. There, the
problem is not warlordism, but a centralized tyranny that has deliberately
starved much of the population to death and driven the country to ruin.
The Mugabe regime's gun confiscation program has been an integral part
of the process.242 The people of Zimbabwe have every right to forcefully
resist the Mugabe regime. As Robert Mugabe once stated, "Only a
government that subjects itself to the rule of law has any moral right to
demand of its citizens obedience to the rule of law ....
Although Western gun prohibition organizations deny that arms are
of any use to people resisting tyranny, Mugabe knows better. In 1976, he
said, "Our votes must go together with our guns; after all, any vote we
shall have, shall have been the product of the gun. The gun, which
produces the votes, should remain its security officer, its guarantor. The
people's vote and the people's guns are always inseparable twins." 244
In disarming the people of Zimbabwe, Mugabe set the preconditions
for depriving them of the right to vote in free elections.
Humanitarian assistance providing arms for the people of
Zimbabwe would not necessarily allow them to overthrow the Mugabe
tyranny immediately. At the least, arms would allow the people some
241.

242.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143-44.

See David B. Kopel, Dailies ignoring Zimbabwe crisis, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS/DENVER POST, Sept. 1, 2002, available at http://www.davekopel.com/Medial
RMN/2002/Zimbabwe.htm; David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne Eisen, Ripe for
Genocide, NAT'L REv. ONLINE, Feb. 13, 2001, http://www.davekopel.com/NRO/2001/
Ripe-for-Genocide.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2009); see also Zimbabwe Loses Food, Find
Guns, STRATEGYPAGE, March 11, 2006, http://www.strategypage.comi/qnd/pothot/
articles/2006031 l.aspx (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) ("The government arrested 15 people
allegedly connected with the arms stockpile found earlier in the week in the town of
Mutare. All fifteen are members of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).").
243. Brian Kagoro, The Prisoners of Hope: Civil Society and the Opposition in
Zimbabwe, 14 AFR. SEC. REv. 19, 19 (2005) (quoting Robert Mugabe, Address to the
Organisation of African Unity, July 22, 1980).
244. Chris Maroleng, Zimbabwe's Zezuru Sum Game, 14 AFR. SEC. REv. 77, 80
(2005) (quoting Robert Mugabe, radio address from Maputo, 1976).
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means to defend themselves from Mugabe's secret police and the various
government-run gangs of thugs.
The personal right of self-defense is the foundation of international
law itself, as the classical founders such as Vitoria, Suarez, Grotius,
Pufendorf, and Vattel elucidated.24 5
If one's primary objective is the protection of human rights, then
one must realistically acknowledge that, especially in situations where
the international community cannot disarm the perpetrators of human
rights abuses, then the victims of the abuses have the human right of selfdefense, and the derivative right to arms necessary for legitimate selfdefense.
V.

CONCLUSION

Samuel Johnson reportedly described a second marriage as "[t]he
triumph of hope over experience."2 46 But at least in a second marriage,
one of the spouses is different. The proponents of the arms trade treaty
are offering a particularly implausible promise that hope will triumph
over expenence.
An ATT might (if it evades the need for approval by the U.N.
Security Council) create more arms embargoes. There is no evidence
that these new embargoes will be any more effective than the many
failed embargoes of the past.
Transnational moral entrepreneurs 247 keep themselves in business
and affirm their moral worth by campaigning for an ATT. But there
appears no realistic prospect that their program will help the victims of
human rights abuses. In a debate before the House of Lords, the Earl of
Sandwich stated the obvious: "[A]rms control is one of those subjects

245. See Kopel, Gallant & Eisen, supra note 56.
246. 1 JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D. 334 (London, Henry
Baldwin, 1791).
247. See PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE:
CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 19 (2006):
Often organized and linked through transnational advocacy networks, they
mobilize popular opinion and political support both within their host country
and abroad, they stimulate and assist in the creation of like-minded
organizations in other countries, and they play a significant role in elevating
their objective beyond its identification with the national interest of their
government; indeed, their transnational efforts are often directed toward
persuading foreign audiences (especially foreign elites) that a particular
prohibition regime reflects not merely the peculiar moral code of one society
but a more widely shared, even universal, moral sense.
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where high-flown phrases of intent disguise the reality of failure and
incapacity on the ground." 24 8
Once the ATT fails, the transnational entrepreneurs will likely be
back with demands for yet another instrument of international law, which
will supposedly succeed at performing the arms supply-control miracle at
which all previous international laws have failed. For persons whose
primary concern is not an obsession with arms control, but is instead a
determination to defend human rights, it is long past time to stop wasting
effort on an ATT and to get to work on looking for genuinely effective
ways to help the people of Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and the world's many other victims of human rights abuses.

248. See House of Lords Debates, Arms Trade Treaty, May 15, 2008, available at
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2008-05-15a.1152.2 (last visited Oct. 16,
2009) (quoting The Earl of Sandwich, 475 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2008) 1162).
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El Tratado Global de Armas: El Zimbabwe, la Repdiblica
Democritica del Congo, y el Efecto de los Embargos de Armas sobre
los Violadores de los Derechos Humanos
Por David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant y Joanne D. Eisen
Traducido por Jeffrey Widmayer
Articulo presentado a la Reuni6n Anual de la Comit6 de Investigaci6n de
la Sociologia del Derecho, el 8 de julio, 2009. Ofiate International
Institute for the Sociology of Law. Antigua Universidad del Pais Vasco,
Ofiate, Gipuzkoa, Espafia.
Resumen: Los defensores del propuesto Tratado Global de Armas de las
Naciones Unidas (Arms Trade Treaty, ATT) prometen que el tratado
impedird la venta de armas a los violadores de derechos humanos. Este
articulo examinard el ATT y observa que el ATT, si implementado como
prometido, exigirA muchos embargos adicionales de armas, incluyendo
embargos contra muchos paises de Africa. Despubs, el articulo
examinarA estudios de de la actual venta de armas a la dictadura de
Zimbabwe y a los lideres militares de la parte oriental de la Repiiblica
Democrdtica del Congo (RDC). Este articulo propone que el ATT no
remediaria las condiciones que han permitido que tantas armas hayan
sido adquiridas por los violadores de derechos humanos en Zimbabwe y
en la RDC. El ATT no tendria mis poder que los embargos que ya han
sido impuestos por el Consejo de Seguridad; entonces las naciones, como
China, que no respetan los actuales embargos del Consejo de Seguridad,
podrian violar los embargos del ATT tambi6n. Por consiguiente, los
activistas de derechos humanos deben buscar otros m6todos de resolver
el problema de las armas en las manos de los violadores de derechos
humanos.
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Le Traite Mondial sur le Commerce des Armes: Le Zimbabwe,
La Rpublique Democratique du Congo, et l'effet des embargos sur
les armes sur les violateurs des droits de l'homme
David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant, et Joanne D. Eisen
Traduit par Jeffrey Widmayer
Article pr6sent6 au Congrbs Annuel du Comit6 de Recherche sur la
Sociologie du Droit, le 8 juillet, 2009. Ofiati International Institute for
the Sociology of Law. Antigua Universidad del Pais Vasco, Ofiati,
Gipuzkoa, Espagne.
Rsum6: Les d6fenseurs du propos6 Trait6 Mondial sur le Commerce
des Armes (TCA) des Nations Unies ont promis que ce trait6 empachera
le commerce des armes aux violateurs des droits de l'homme. Cet essai
examinera d'abord le trait6, et observera que le trait6, s'il est mis en
application comme promis, exigerait des douzaines d'embargos
additionnels sur les armes, y compris des embargos sur beaucoup des
pays de l'Afrique. Aprbs cela, I'essai consid6rera des 6tudes de cas du
fournissement actuel des armes aux dictateurs au Zimbabwe et aux
seigneurs de la guerre A la partie est de la R6publique D6mocratique du
Congo (RDC). L'essai constate que le TCA ne rem6diera gu&re les
conditions qui ont permis l'acquisition des armes par les violateurs des
droits de l'homme au Zimbabwe et A la RDC. Le TCA n'aura plus de
force que les embargos d6ji mis en place par le Conseil de S6curit6 des
Nations Unies ; alors les pays, comme la Chine, qui ne respectent pas les
embargos actuels du Conseil de S6curit6 ignoreront aussi ceux du TCA.
Par cons6quent, le TCA ne fait que distraire, et les militants des droits de
l'homme devraient examiner des m6thodes alternatives d'aborder le
probl~me des armes aux mains des violateurs des droits de l'homme.
Objectif et organisation
Cet essai se pose la question de si le propos6 TCA pourra r6aliser les buts
de ses dMfenseurs: de contr6ler la vente de petites armes afin d'empicher
les violations des droits de l'homme. La premiere partie survolera les
6checs des embargos internationaux des armes et d6crit les obstacles
importants auxquels un TCA efficace devra faire face: les nations
instables qui produisent les armes, le syst6me international de la
souverainet6, et la tendance des dictateurs de ratifier et aprbs ignorer les
trait6s des droits de l'homme, et le march6 noir. La deuxibme partie
discutera les efforts inutiles A restreindre la vente des armes au r6gime
dictatorial du Zimbabwe et consid&rera si un TCA pourrait rendre
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possible un embargo efficace sur le r6gime de Mugabe. La troisibme
partie consid6rera le cas de la RDC, contre laquelle l'ONU a impos6 un
embargo en 2003 et a 61argi l'embargo en 2005. Le r6le de l'ONU ellemime Ala vente des armes Ala RDC sera examine aussi.
La quatribme partie offrira des suggestions alternatives pour la
r6duction de la vente des armes aux violateurs des droits de l'homme et
pour la protection des victimes.
I.

Les 6checs des embargos sur les armes

Le groupe de pression le plus formidable est "Control Arms,"
subsidiaire de Oxfam, Amnesty International, et IANSA (The
International Action Network on Small Arms). Ce groupe affirme que
chacun des treize embargos de l'ONU de cette d6cennie a 6t6 viol6. Par
cons6quent, Control Arms suggbre l'6tablissement du contr8le de la
vente des armes qui soit plus en accord avec le droit international: un
trait6 international de la vente des armes. En ce moment, I'ONU se met
A6crire un tel document. Malgr6 cela, sous le droit international actuel,
le comit6 de la s6curit6 de l'ONU a le pouvoir, sous chapitre 7 de la
Charte de lItablissement de l'ONU, de se mettre en marche face aux
menaces A la paix internationale. Les Etats-Unis, la France, la Grande
Bretagne, la Russie, et la Chine ont le droit du veto. Le TCA permettrait
l'imposition des embargos sans l'accord du Conseil de S6curit6. Grace
aux vetos de la Chine et de la Russie, le Conseil de S6curit6 n'a pas pu
imposer un embargo sur le Zimbabwe, mais un m6canisme ext6rieur
pourrait, peut-&tre, le faire. Au moment, il n'est pas certain si le TCA
serait g6r6 par une institution au sein de l'ONU ou par une organisation
ind~pendante.
A.

Combien d'embargosseront necessaires?

Les d6l6gu6s A l'ONU ont tendance A ratifier des trait6s et apr6s, A
poursuivre des int6r8ts nationaux au d6triment des promis inclus aux
trait6s. En suivant les d6sirs des d6fenseurs du TCA, on serait oblig6
d'imposer un embargo sur la Chine, vu que ce pays emploie des armes
pour la suppression des droits de l'homme et se m6fie des embargos de
l'ONU. Sous le TCA, on verrait la multiplication des embargos: on
serait oblig6 d'en imposer sur la plupart de l'Afrique. En tout cas, la
moiti6 des pays de l'Afrique produisent, d6jA, des armes sur leur terrain.
Souvent, les embargos 6chouent parce que les pays cibl~s ramassent des
armes avant que l'embargo soit impos6. En plus, il est difficile
d'imposer des embargos sans le faire de fagon discriminatoire.
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Sous le TCA, un groupe d'experts auraient besoin de d6terminer la
stabilit6 des nations pour:
1. d6terminer quels utiliseront, probablement, les armes contre les
civils.
2. d6terminer quels pays utiliseront, probablement, les armes pour
cr6er de l'instabilit6 r6gionale, et
3. d6terminer quels pays revendront les armes aux pays qui s'en
serviront pour commettre les d6lits mentionnes ci-dessus.
D'autres difficult6s seront I'identification des pays qui seront
classifi6s "a haut risque." La moiti6 des pays A haut risque produisent
des armes. Il serait presque impossible d'empicher la production des
armes dans ces pays parce que les matibres primaires n6cessaires pour la
production des armes sont similaires Acelles pour d'autres industries.
B.

La souverainetd de l'etat et l'exdcution des trait6s

Tandis que les ONG s'int6ressent Ala r6duction de la violence, les
nations se concernent de la souverainet& nationale. Quatre-vingts dixhuit pays membres de l'ONU ont exprim6 leurs sentiments quant au
TCA et ont constat6 qu'ils veulent prot6ger leur droit (de 1'6tat) de la
possession des armes pour leur propre d6fense et craignent que cela ne
soit pas respect6 sous un TCA. L'article 51 de la charte de l'ONU
garantit le droit A se d6fendre aux pays membres. Les pays membres
craignent aussi la perte de leur "droit" de fabriquer des armes. Mais, la
reconnaissance d'un tel droit mbnerait A une catastrophe des droits
humains.
Logiquement, comme le TCA est le produit des ONG qui veulent la
r6duction des armes, il ne reconnait pas les droits individuels de se
d6fendre, de combattre l'oppression, et de jouir de la s6curit6 au foyer.
En somme, le TCA est aveugle envers les droits individuels, tandis qu'il
cr6e des droits gouvernementaux.
L'ex6cution du TCA ne sera pas sans probl~mes. Les 6tats
membres seraient oblig6s A rendre des d6terminations de leur propre
conformit6 au TCA. Au cas oh ils ne se conforment pas aux exigences
du trait6, les g6rants du TCA ne pourraient que critiquer ce manque de la
bonne volont6. En contraste, le Conseil de S6curit6 de l'ONU a le
pouvoir d'ex6cuter les embargos. Les violateurs des droits de l'homme
pr6f6reraient, peut-8tre, vivre sous un TCA que sous le pouvoir du
Conseil de S6curit6. D6jd, I'histoire du contr8le des armes a montr6 la
diff6rence entre ce que les pays membres disent qu'ils feront et ce qu'ils
font, en fait.
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C. Les dictatures et l'adhision aux traitesdes droits de l'homme
Les d6fenseurs du TCA constatent qu'un tel trait6 cr6era des
embargos internationaux, auxquels toutes les nations devront se
conformer. Mais est-ce qu'ils s'y conformeraient? Les fournisseurs les
plus importants des armes sont des dictatures. L'histoire sugg&re qu'ils
ne s'y conformeraient point. Souvent, les etats qui ratifient des trait6s
destin6s Ala protection des droits de l'homme sans h6siter sont ceux qui
sont tellement oppressifs qu'ils ne craignent pas que l'adh6sion A un tel
trait6 serve comme base d'opposition. Par exemple, I'Arabie Saoudite a
ratifi6 le CEDAW, sans crainte que les f6ministes saoudites 16vent leur
voix contre des violations des droits de la femme commises par l'6tat.
Les r6gimes oppressifs ratifient les trait6s des droits de l'homme pour
cr~er l'impression d'8tre 16gitimes au point de vu humanitaire, tandis
qu'ils n'ont aucune intention de les suivre.
D.

Le marchi noir

Les estimations de la valeur du march6 noir des armes varient entre
deux et quinze milliards de dollars chaque ann~e (mais, par d6finition, on
manque des chiffres fiables de ce commerce). Il ne serait pas r6aliste
d'imaginer que, sous un TCA, les pays foumiraient les chiffres
concernant les ventes illicites des armes. Il est possible que la manibre la
plus efficace de diminuer la vente des armes aux pays de haut risque soit
de r6duire le besoin des armes des habitants de ces pays; s'il y avait plus
de s6curit6 A l'int6rieur de ces pays, les habitants n'auraient pas besoin
des armes. Cependant, les seigneurs de la guerre ne vont pas augmenter
le niveau de s6curit6 Al'int6rieur de leurs pays. Les d6fenseurs du TCA
n'expliquent pas comment, sous un tel trait6, les g6rants auraient le
pouvoir de punir ceux qui ne s'y conforment pas. Comment est-ce qu'un
TCA pourrait 8tre ex6cut6 d'une manibre plus efficace qu'un embargo du
Conseil de Scurit6 de l'ONU? Une r6solution de ce conseil est la
directive la plus puissant du droit international. Si un embargo du
Conseil de S~curit6 n'a pas la force d'empacher la vente des armes au
march& noir, pourquoi imaginer qu'un TCA la poss6derait?
II.

Le Zimbabwe

La nation du Zimbabwe est pr6cis6ment la sorte d'etat qui ne
devrait pas avoir l'opportunit6 d'acheter des armes. Pendant I'61ection la
plus r6cente, qui, pareil que les elections pr6c6dentes, a 6t6 vol6e par le
dictateur Robert Mugabe, I'6tat a opprim6 ses d6tracteurs politiques,
ainsi que ceux qui ont protest6 la corruption de l'6lection. Avec la force
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des armes, I'arm6e nationale du Zimbabwe, la police et les milices des
jeunes du parti politique de Mugabe ont supprim6 l'opposition politique
de fagon violente et ont donn6 du contr8le des sources alimentaires au
gouvemement. Cela n'est pas nouveau; en 1983, I'arm~e du Zimbabwe
a commis des meurtres en masse, des viols, de la torture, et des
enlvements dans la partie centrale du pais et A Matabeleland. Le
Zimbabwe a aussi, A la fin du vingtibme sicle et au d6but du si~cle
vingt-et-un, a profit6 des guerres A la RDC pour envahir le sud du pays et
voler des min&taux. Grice Ala Chine, il n'y a pas d'embargo du Conseil
de S~curit6 sur le Zimbabwe. La Chine s'en sert de son veto pour
empacher des embargos sur le Zimbabwe, disant que les problmes du
Zimbabwe existent A l'int6rieur de ce pays et que l'intervention de
l'ONU ne serait pas justifiable.
L'Union Africaine n'a pas mis
d'embargo sur le Zimbabwe. L'Union Europ6enne a mis un embargo sur
ce pais, mais cela n'oblige que les pays de l'Europe A l'ob6ir.
A. L'Assistance illegale de l'Afrique du Sud 6 la vente des armes au
Zimbabwe
En mars, 2008, la Chine a envoy6 des armes destin6es au
Zimbabwe. L'Afrique du Sud a approuv6 le transfert de ces armes A
travers son pays. Cependant, I'Afrique du Sud avait d6jA son trait6
contre la vente des armes, qu'elle a aussi viol6. A la r6union du Conseil
de S6curit6 en 2008, I'Afrique du Sud, la Libye, le Vietnam, la Russie, et
la Chine ont vot6 contre l'embargo sur le Zimbabwe. L'Afrique du Sud
est un pays d6mocratique, avec une judiciaire efficace et une presse libre.
Si une d6mocratie ne respecte ni ses propres lois, ni les trait6s de l'ONU,
est-ce que l'on peut imaginer que les dictatures y ob6iront?
B.

La vente des armes de la Chine a Mugabe

La Chine vend des armes A Mugabe en 6change de la protection des
droits pr6coloniaux de la Chine aux mines du Zimbabwe. En 2008, la
Chine a envoy6 des armes au Zimbabwe, en passant par le Soudan et la
RDC (en flagrant violation de l'embargo de l'ONU). Le seul incident
connu qui concerne le transfert des armes de la Chine au Zimbabwe a t
celui du navire An Yue Jiang, qui transportait des munitions pour les
AK-47, parmi d'autres armes. Voulant 6viter de la honte internationale,
la Chine a d6clar6 qu'elle avait rappel6 le navire. Cependant, le navire
est arriv6 au Zimbabwe, aprbs 8tre pass6 par plusieurs pays de l'Afrique.
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Les armes brisiliennes au Zimbabwe

La Chine n'est pas le seul fournisseur d'armes A Mugabe. Le
Zimbabwe est parmi les cinq clients les plus importants des armes du
Notamment, le pr6sident du Br6sil, Lula, a propos6 un
Br6sil.
r6f6rendum A prohiber les armes au Br6sil, mais il a perdu 64% contre
36%. Cependant, il a le pouvoir 16gal d'arr8ter l'exportation des armes A
un dictateur m6pris6, et il a refus6 de le faire. Ses actions renforcent le
souppon que la plupart des hommes politiques parlent du contr6le des
armes pour recevoir des b6n6fices politiques, et ils manquent du vrai
d6sir de r6duire la vente des armes aux dictateurs.
D. Le contrebandier d'armes du Zimbabwe est aussi le deligud du
Zimbabwe t l'ONU.
Le colonel Tshinga Dube joue les deux r6les. Il est r6v6lateur que
le gouvernement du Zimbabwe, qui envoie, comme d6l6gu6 principal, un
contrebandier des armes au congrbs de l'ONU au sujet de la vente illicite
des armes, soutient tellement le programme du contr6le des petites armes
de l'ONU. Il n'y avait personne au congres qui soit impoli au point
d'indiquer que le d616gu6 du Zimbabwe 6tait trafiquant des armes. Si les
ONG et leurs alli6s n'ont pas lev6 la voix contre ces actions de la part du
Zimbabwe A l'ONU, on ne peut pas croire qu'ils vont tre plus
courageux sous un TCA A restreindre la vente des armes au Zimbabwe,
surtout parce que, comme A l'ONU actuel, la Chine aura le pouvoir de
facto du veto, mime si elle n'a pas de pouvoir formel du veto.
III. La Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo
Riche en ressources naturelles, la r6gion qui est maintenant la RDC
est, depuis longtemps, parmi les endroits les plus mis6rables du monde.
Elle a 6 colonis~e par les belges pendant les ann6es 1880. Sous les
belges, qui n'ont instaur6 ni l'6ducation, ni l'infrastructure, ni la loi, la
r6gion a beaucoup souffert. La p6riode postind6pendance a 6t encore
pire. A cause des guerres A l'est du pays, plus que 1,3 millions de
personnes ont perdu leurs maisons. On estime qu'entre deux et cinq
millions de personnes sont mortes Acause des guerres.
A.

Les embargos du Conseil de Securitj de 2003 et 2005

Le 28 juillet, 2003, le Conseil de S6curit6 a mis un embargo sur les
provinces du nord-est de la RDC: sur le Kivu du Nord, le Kivu du Sud,
et la Province Oriental. L'embargo s'appliquait aussi aux groupes A la
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RDC qui n'avaient pas accept6 le nouveau trait6 de la paix. Le Conseil
de Scurit6 a condamn6 les violations des droits de l'homme commises A
la RDC, comme la violence contre les femmes et aussi contre le vol des
ressources naturelles de la r6gion. Cet organisme a demand6 que les
pays voisins aident d restaurer la paix dans la r6gion, mais les experts de
l'ONU ont d6clar6 que la valeur minerale, les pratiques immorales de
commerce, et l'influence des pays ext~rieurs empichaient une r6solution
paisible. En 2005, les experts du Conseil de Securit6 ont constat6 que les
officiels de la Ruanda et de l'Uganda vendaient des armes aux r6gions de
la RDC, qui 6tait sous l'embargo. Le march6 noir avait pris le contr6le.
Le 18 avril 2005, le Conseil de S6curit6 a 61argi l'embargo pour inclure
la totalite de la RDC.
B. Les violations d'embargo commises par l'Albanie, le Burundi, la
Chine, la RDC, le Ruanda, l'Afrique du Sud, le Soudan, l'Uganda, et le
Zimbabwe
Depuis 2003, aucune nation n'a avou6 l'exportation des armes A la
RDC; n6anmoins, elle n'en manque pas. La Chine a foumi des armes a
Kivu, A Ituri, et d d'autres parties de la RDC a travers l'Uganda, le
Ruanda, et le Burundi. L'arm6e du gouvernement de l'Uganda trafique
des armes d la RDC, commettant une flagrante violation de l'embargo de
l'ONU. Le gouvernement de l'Afrique du Sud permet le transport des
armes destin6es d la RDC A tre envoy~es Ala Ruanda. L'ONU ne fait
rien pour reagir a ces violations de son embargo.
C. La participationde l'ONU au passage en contrebande en violation
de l'embargo de L'ONU
En 2007, un correspondant du BBC a r6v616 qu'un pakistanais des
forces des Nations Unies pour le maintien de la paix vendait des armes
aux groupes militaires congolais: les mimes groupes que les forces pour
le maintien de la paix devaient d6sarmer. L'ONU a fait semblance
d'investiguer l'incident, mais a d6clar6 qu'elle n'avait rien trouv6.
Pourtant, on sait que les munitions fabriqu6es au Pakistan ont 6t6
confisqu6es des groupes congolais. La lenteur et la manque de
responsabilit6 de l'investigation ont 6 critiqu6s par les ONG. Il n'est
pas surprenant que les forces de l'ONJ aient jou6 un r6le au trafic des
armes. D'autres membres des forces pour le maintien de la paix de
l'ONIJ ont sexuellement maltrait6 les fernmes et les enfants au Congo,
un fait que l'ONU a cach6. Selon les ONG qui souhaitent r6duire la
quantit6 des armes, si un officiel de l'6tat ne r6agit pas au trafic des
armes aux violateurs des droits de l'homme, cela veut dire qu'il est
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criminellement responsable devant la Cour Criminelle Internationale
(CCI). Alors, le CCI devrait investiguer les officiels de l'ONU.
D.

La Cour CriminelleInternationale

En thborie, une violation d'un embargo du ATT pourrait etre
poursuivie Ala Cour Criminelle Internationale (CCI). Ainsi, le ATT ne
fait que reproduire le droit international existant, vu qu'une violation
d'un embargo du Conseil de S6curit6 pourrait aussi mener A une
poursuite dans cette cour. La CCI n'aidera pas A r6duire la vente des
armes aux violateurs des droits de l'homme. Les organisations des droits
humains 6taient contentes quand le CCI a arrat6 Thomas Lubanga, chef
de l'Union Congolais Patriotique (UCP). Lubanga et son groupe, on
croit, ont commis beaucoup de viols et de meurtres au nord-est du
Congo. Cependant, la CCI a pris du d6lai A le poursuivre et les seules
inculpations contre lui 6taient d'employer les enfants soldats.
E. Apris avoir chou6 deuxfois, faites la meme chose de nouveau.
Control Arms croit que les 6checs des embargos du Conseil de
S6curit6 font la preuve du besoin d'un ATT, mais il n'est pas probable
que les nations qui n'ob6issent aux embargos d6jA existants vont
respecter un ATT. Deux obligations avec la force de la loi internationale
ne vont pas etre efficaces, odi une seule obligation a t sans effet. Le
Ruanda, I'Uganda, le Soudan, le Burundi et la RDC tous ont sign6 le
Protocole de Nairobi, un trait& pour la r6duction des armes parrain6 par
l'ONU. L'insistance de ce protocole a eu l'effet de d6sarmer les
habitants de ces pays, les rendant sans d6fense contre les violations des
droits de l'homme. Cependant, le trafic des armes continue dans ces
pays.
IV. Deux alternatives
Dans cette partie de Particle, nous proposons deux id6es de
comment arr8ter l'acquisition des armes par les violateurs des droits de
l'homme. On ne constate ni que ce sont les seules possibilit6s, ni
qu'elles, seules, pourront r6soudre le problame entier.
Nous les
proposons seulement comme point de d6part. Puisqu'on ne peut pas
imaginer qu'un ATT sera une reussite ot les embargos ant~rieurs ont
6chou6, I'ATT est une perte de temps et de ressources dangereuse. Les
organisations humanitaires et les diplomates devraient chercher d'autres
moyens de r6duire la vente des armes.

THE ARMS TRADE TREATY

2010]

A.

953

Rduire l'aide etrangire

L'aide 6trangre finance jusqu'd quarante pour cent des achats des
armes des r6gimes africains. Le FMI a suspendu l'aide au Zimbabwe au
d6but de ce si~cle. Cela a diminu6 les fonds du r6gime pour acheter des
armes. Le gouvernement de Ruanda d6pend de l'aide 6trangbre et
n'aurait pas pu acheter des armes sans cet argent.
B.

Fournirdes armes pour la ddfense de soi-mime

Une grande partie de la victimisation des habitants de la RDC est
fait exprs. Le pillage, les viols, et le meurtre sont fr6quents. Dans une
ville, Faradje, les habitants terroris~s ont form6 une milice pour se
d6fendre. Ils s'arment des haches, des machettes, et des fusils de
mauvaise qualit6. Il serait facile de munir la milice de Faradje pour les
aider A se d6fendre contre les violateurs des droits de l'homme. En
revanche, il est possible que les armes foumies aux civils ne soient pas
utilis6es pour se d6fendre. Si les peuples de l'est de la RDC pouvaient
retourner &un moment oi on s'armait des arcs et des flches, la situation
serait mieux. Mais ils sont proie aux seigneurs de la guerre, qui ont
acquis des armes puissantes, une situation que l'ONU a aid6 & r6aliser.
Puisque les seigneurs de la guerre se nourrissent du pillage, les habitants
pourraient couper leurs provisions s'ils pouvaient se d6fendre. Quand les
organisations intemationales ne sont pas capables &prot6ger les habitants
d'une r6gion, ils ont le droit de se d6fendre. Mugabe lui-mime a dit que
la libert6 de voter est li6e au droit de pouvoir se d6fendre. En d6sarmant
les habitants de Zimbabwe, il a assur6 qu'ils ne puissent pas s'exprimer
librement aux 6lections.
V.

Conclusion

Un ATT pourrait cr6er encore plus d'embargos des armes (s'il
fonctionne sans l'accord du Conseil de Scurit6). Il n'y a pas d'6vidence
que ces nouveaux embargos seraient plus efficaces que ceux d'avant.
Les entrepreneurs transnationaux de moralit6 s'occupent A mener une
campagne en faveur d'un ATT pour affirmer leur valeur sociale.
Toutefois, leur programme n'aidera pas aux victimes des violations
des droits de l'homme. Pour ceux qui ne se concernent pas avec le
contr6le des armes, mais avec la protection des droits de l'homme, c'est
le moment de chercher des moyens efficaces A aider les habitants du
Zimbabwe, de la RDC, et les autres victimes des violations des droits de
l'homme.

